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How does a leading firm sustain its competence-based advantage in a competitive landscape 
against threats of imitation and substitution? In high-velocity competitive markets, an inherent 
tension arises when firms wish to prolong the value of their technological competencies, while 
rivals seek to make those competencies obsolete. These markets are characterized by continuous 
technological change, fickle customers, and frequent shifts in the competitive landscape. Firms 
must continually update their innovative competencies that are recurrently targets of imitation 
and substitution, and managers face challenges in discerning the appropriate competencies their 
firms should commit to and which they should avoid, resulting in the difficulty of setting 
straightforward strategic goals for the firm. Looking in the hard disk drive industry from 1987 to 
1999, I empirically show that leading firms’ knowledge disclosure of core technologies has a 
positive effect on the probability of laggards imitating the leader. Moreover, I show that after 
leading firms disclose, they introduce next-generation products sooner and prevent laggards from 
quickly introducing their next-generation products. Thus, I suggest that a leading firm’s 
knowledge disclosing activities can shape the competitive landscape by influencing rivals’ scope 
of search for innovation opportunities. Namely, leading firms can prolong their established 
competencies by disclosing knowledge on their innovations by promoting imitation and delaying 
or preventing substitution. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
In any industry, leading firms constantly face competitive threats of imitation and substitution 
(Barney, 1991; Ghemawat, 1986; Porter, 1985)1
                                                 
1 My assumption of the conceptualization and operationalization of imitation and substitution is that they are two 
ends of a continuum at the component level. Namely, a next-generation product that is introduced to a market by a 
laggard is either imitation or substitution, not both. It either produces a component (or set of components) which is 
(are) similar (imitate) or different (substitute). In this context, imitation would be different from substitution since 
the resources and capabilities that are required to carry out the two competitive responses are substantially different 
(e.g. thin film head technology and ferrite film head technology requires different types of technological knowledge 
and process knowledge.)  
. However, managing these two threats 
simultaneously is often a difficult task in high-velocity, technology-intense markets since 
continuous technological change, fickle customers, and frequent shifts in rivals’ imitation and 
substitution strategies heighten the uncertainty of what technological standard would prevail. 
Managers of leading firms face challenges in discerning the appropriate competencies their firms 
should commit to and which they should avoid, resulting in the difficulty of setting 
straightforward strategic goals for the firm. In these environments profit margins per product 
generation tend to be small, and there is a constantly increasing demand for new technologies. 
Thus, leading firms must continually update their competencies and consistently succeed in the 
race for innovation (Aoki, 1991; Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983), anticipating and setting the next 
technological standard (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Arthur, 1989; Farrell & Saloner, 1985; 
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Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1993). At the same time, these firms need to build some elements of 
stability into their capabilities in order to exploit their established competencies (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 2002; March, 1991). Evidence from prior studies on competition in 
hypercompetitive settings show that leading firms are easily dethroned or even fail to survive in 
the market when they are not successful in delicately managing the need to change frequently 
and yet perform reliably within each technology generation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; Smith et al., 2001; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). For instance, Christensen et al. 
(1998) showed that in the hard disk drive industry all of 17 firms that had populated the industry 
in 1976 had not survived until 1990, 100 of 124 firms that had entered the industry during the 
period had failed and exited, or had been acquired. He argued that firms that had entered 
emerging (rather than established) markets with architectural (rather than incremental 
component) innovations had a higher probability of survival, but only when they entered before 
the establishment of a dominant design.   
How can leading firms maintain the stability to exploit established competencies while 
successfully exploring for innovations? I argue that this question can be answered by examining 
the competitive dynamics between leaders and laggards in terms of imitation and substitution. 
Namely, since substitution poses a more formidable threat than imitation, the success of 
introducing next-generation innovations and setting the dominant design depends on how the 
leading firms manage the threat of substitution in conjunction with imitation. More specifically, 
drawing from an attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997), I suggest that the disclosure of 
leaders’ knowledge on its innovative efforts promotes imitation and therefore delays potential 
substitution, rendering the stability to prolong the technological playing field. At the same time, 
 3 
leaders may gain the flexibility to achieve speed in developing next-generation technologies that 
set dominant designs.   
In pursuing this issue, I claim to make three contributions to the literature of innovation 
and competitive dynamics. First, I take into consideration both imitation and substitution as 
competitive threats and show how leading firms may deal with them simultaneously but 
differently. Firms would reap enduring value from resources and capabilities if they withstand 
both imitation and substitution, rather than focusing solely on protecting imitation barriers 
(Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Chen, 1996; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; McEvily et al., 2000; Peteraf & 
Bergen, 2003). Interestingly, while the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) has defined the resources that renders a firm its sustaining 
competitive advantages as valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991), we 
find a lack of focus considering how firms protect their technological competencies against 
imitation and substitution (Adner & Zemsky, 2006). Thus, while resource-based view scholars 
acknowledge the issue of resource value and substitution, the construct is less developed than 
that of barriers to imitation (Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
Prior studies have even emphasized the relatively higher importance of dealing with 
substitution compared to imitation, arguing that substitution may be more formidable in the sense 
that it has a higher probability to displace a firm out of the competitive landscape (Golder & 
Tellis, 1993; Ma & Karri, 2005; Yoo, 2005). For example, Janney and Dess (2006) contended 
that while the threats of imitation will erode a firm's returns to a breakeven level, the threats from 
substitution can make a rival firm's resource obsolete, rendering them without any value. Thus, I 
examine how leading firms may even promote imitation to some extent in order to delay or 
prevent substitution by laggards.  
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Second, I build on the literature of voluntary knowledge disclosure, and assert that 
leading firms may have strategic motivations to disclose knowledge to their rivals. The 
conventional wisdom on disclosure is that managers would guard information through various 
mechanisms (e.g. secrecy or developing complex, specific and tacit resources) since knowledge 
appropriation prevents rivals from knowing what to imitate or how to develop substitutes for its 
capabilities (Barney, 1991). Further, secrecy would give leading firms the time to establish 
dominant positions and appropriate returns from an innovation, while staying ahead of rivals 
(Cohen et al., 2000; McEvily & Chakravarthy, 2002). If a firm does voluntarily disclose 
knowledge (e.g. information on R&D projects, technologies from launched products, information 
in patents, etc.), it faces a dilemma that is called the “paradox of disclosure (Arrow, 1962).” This 
has been observed in situations to reduce information asymmetry, such as when a firm discloses 
information to its current or potential investors. Namely, disclosure reduces uncertainty and 
helps investors make better estimates of R&D outcomes and future profits, thus reducing 
financing costs for the disclosing firm (James, 2007). The paradox is that the disclosing firm 
becomes more transparent and is left more susceptible to imitation risk by its competitors. In 
other words, disclosure may attract rivals’ attention and spur efforts to erode imitation barriers, 
and as a result, competitors may benefit from lower innovation costs or time-to-discovery, 
challenging the survival of the leading firm (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983; Choi, 1991). Thus, 
firms would disclose only if the expected benefits of disclosure exceed the perceived proprietary 
costs of disclosure. While studies have considered the positive effects of knowledge disclosure, 
such as a firm’s stock price (Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002) or increased 
opportunities of access to external financing, it is less clear in a competitive dynamics sense why 
firms would disclose knowledge and how it affects the competitive landscape.  
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Recently, some studies have focused on the strategic motivations to disclose knowledge. 
James (2007) showed that when firms have technological capabilities that reduce imitation risk, 
they would have strategic incentives to disclose even in the absence of financing incentives, for 
example, benefiting from broadcasting their capabilities to attract potential marketing 
collaborators or licensees of a given technology. Other studies such as Coff, Coff, & Eastvold 
(2006), Coff, Lee & Hayward (2008), and Harhoff (1996) suggest that firms may increase their 
ability to exploit their competitive advantages by voluntarily disclosing information on their 
R&D efforts. These studies typically assume that imitation barriers, either from “no disclosure” 
or “disclosure and fending off imitators,” is the main source of sustaining its competitive 
advantage. However, in some industries such as the hard disk drive industry, leading firms 
vigorously engage in knowledge disclosure activities (e.g. patent application2
                                                 
2 Although patents are commonly understood as a means to appropriate and protect a firm’s knowledge, patent 
grants have been shown to have a disclosure effect with various motivations (Lhuillery, 2006). Moreover, patent 
counts have been used as a proxy of knowledge disclosure, especially with respect to the technological component 
of a firm’s product, in various studies (Baker & Mezzetti, 2005; Coff et al., 2008; De Fraja, 1993; Lichtman et al., 
2000).  
, publications, joint 
research consortiums, announcements through media, strategic alliances) even when the rate of 
imitation is high (Mansfield, 1961, 1984; Mansfield et al., 1981). Interestingly, the hard disk 
drive industry is not an environment that provides strong patent protection, and the firms that are 
disclosing knowledge in the industry are not always those with strong technological capabilities. 
Regarding the arguments that firms that operate in industries with weak patent protection have 
greater imitation risk and consequently are more likely to face greater competition and lower 
profits after an increase in disclosure (James, 2007), I argue that knowledge disclosure by 
leading firms before a dominant design is established in product architecture has strategic 
implications. Responding to James and Shaver’s (2008) call that “we know of no empirical 
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studies that test the effect of disclosure on rivals,” I propose and test the strategic motivations of 
firms’ knowledge disclosure and the effects of knowledge disclosure on competitive reactions in 
the context of innovation and technological development.  
Third, I bridge competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 1992; Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Grimm & Smith, 1997; Smith et al., 1992) and the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 
1997), suggesting in order to exploit their technological competencies and explore for 
innovations, leading firms may disclose knowledge so as to influence laggards’ scope of search. 
Literature on how firms’ deploy innovative efforts has mainly focused on the focal firm’s 
internal capabilities rather than in conjunction with rivals’ competitive actions. For example, 
proponents of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) and the knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender & Grant, 
1996) have mainly focused on the resources that have isolating mechanisms such as causal 
ambiguity, firm specificity, or social complexity, assuming that these resources would assure the 
difficulty for rivals to imitate (Coff et al., 2008). However, such resources are not entirely 
inimitable since rivals may develop their own substitutes (Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Coff et al., 
2008; Makadok, 2001). A competitive dynamics view, examining the interaction between the 
firm and its competitive environment, would give us a clearer picture on how leading firms 
manage their knowledge-based competencies when they are confronted with threats of imitation 
and substitution.  
While competitors are constantly searching for new innovations (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
Nelson & Winter, 1982), it is oftentimes local or familiar territory where managers of rival firms 
search for directions of innovation since they are boundedly rational (Cyert & March, 1963). Due 
to information asymmetry between leaders and laggards, leaders are constantly threatened by the 
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uncertainty of various potential substitutes, since each laggard may pursue their own way of 
solutions to innovate. Namely, the imperfect nature of information influences what strategies are 
undertaken in response (Chen, 1996). As a mechanism of signaling and gaining attention, 
knowledge disclosure may reduce information asymmetries, increasing the familiarity of the 
leaders’ innovation (Ocasio, 1997) and thus promoting laggards to imitate. Consequently, leaders 
can delay or prevent substitution and may enjoy lead time in innovating next-generation 
technologies. Thus, I build on the competitive dynamics literature and the attention-based view 
by considering how leaders might influence laggards’ attention of search processes for 
innovation.   
In sum, I propose a strategic motivation of knowledge disclosure and empirically test the 
effect of leading firms’ knowledge disclosure on the competitive behavior of rivals (i.e. imitation 
and substitution), and test the sustainability of the technological competence of the knowledge-
disclosing firm, after the disclosure has been made.  
1.2 RESEARCH SETTING: THE HARD DISK DRIVE (HDD) INDUSTRY 
The Hard Disk Drive (HDD) industry has been characterized as a competition amongst HDD 
manufacturers in a high-paced, high-stakes race for leadership in both technology and the cost of 
production. To survive in the industry, HDD firms have been under time pressure to introduce 
higher storage capacities on ever-smaller devices at less cost and in less time (McKendrick et al., 
2000).  
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1.2.1 Technological Challenge 
Technological development in the hard disk drive industry has been made along two main 
dimensions –capacity and size. The technological challenge for hard disk drive firms is to deliver 
drives with higher capacity in terms of the number of bits of data that can be stored on every 
square inch of the disk, otherwise known as the HDD’s areal density (AD). Since IBM shipped 
the first movable-head disk drive in 1956, the industry has undergone tremendous technological 
change. Until 1991, areal density increased at an annual rate of 30 percent, but grew by an 
astounding 60 percent per year from 1992-1997, a faster rate of progress than semiconductors, 
and an amazing 125 percent in 1998, our last year of study. Even with industry age, 
technological change in this industry has been accelerating. Figure 1 shows the growth in areal 
density for four different form factors. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
This explosion of areal density development pressed firms to be first to the market with a new 
drive with higher capacity, and those that were late to market typically suffered a severe revenue 
penalty, having forced either to absorb their R&D costs and start with the next generation 
capacity drives or to exit the industry (McKendrick, 2004). First mover leadership in terms of 
innovation typically was not sustained, and the rapidly decreasing profitability within each 
product life-cycle pushed firms to innovate as quickly as possible. Many firms could not keep up 
with the continuous demand of new product innovations, and as a result had exited the industry 
(Figure 2).  
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Along with capacity enhancements, HDD firms have been faced with demand of 
reducing the physical size of disk drives, called “form factors.” Form factors have been shrinking 
from disk diameters of 39, 31 and 24 inches to 14, 8, 5.25, 3.5, 2.5, 1.8, 1 and 0.85 inch drives.3 
These changes in size were problematic for many drive manufacturers, and most firms did not 
survive the transitions. For some HDD firms, technological factors lay behind the inability to 
introduce smaller form factors: scaling down components, or substituting more advanced ones, 
and getting designs to work properly constituted non-trivial engineering challenges (McKendrick, 
2004). Other firms had failed to build smaller form factors and serve customers in new markets 
(Christensen, 1997). Following is a summary of the various form factors and the firms that first 
used the form factors.4
 
 
14 inch drives 
In 1973, IBM introduced the first “Winchester” drive, a permanently sealed drive that 
kept the disks, heads, motors, actuators and electronics inside a dust-proof housing. This 
architectural innovation overcame the inherent limit of the recording density – proximity of the 
heads positioned to the disks and particulate contamination on the disk surfaces causing 
read/write errors. Figure 3 shows the primary components of the Winchester drive.  
                                                 
3 Although there were larger drives in earlier years, the 14-inch drives were the first that were “Winchester drives,” 
sealed drives that served as the standard worldwide. A more detailed description of earlier, larger drives can be 
found in Christensen (1993). 
4 Excerpt form Christensen (1992) and www.wikipedia.com 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
8 inch drives 
In 1979, Shugart Associates' SA1000 was the first form factor compatible HDD, having the same 
dimensions and a compatible interface to the 8 inch floppy disk drive.  
 
5.25 inch drives 
This smaller form factor, first used in an HDD by Seagate in 1980, was the same size as full 
height 5¼-inch diameter floppy disk drive, i.e., 3.25 inches high. This is twice as high as "half 
height" commonly used today; i.e., 1.63 in (41.4 mm). Most desktop models of drives for optical 
120 mm disks (DVD, CD) use the half height 5¼ inch dimension, but it fell out of fashion for 
HDDs.  
 
3.5 inch drives 
This smaller form factor, first used in an HDD by Rodime in 1983, was the same size as the "half 
height" 3½ inch floppy disk drives. Today it has been largely superseded by 1-inch high 
“slimline” or “low-profile” versions of this form factor which is used by most desktop HDDs. 
 
2.5 inch drives 
This form factor was introduced to the industry by PrairieTek in 1988. It has been widely used 
for hard-disk drives in mobile devices (laptops, music players, etc.) and as of 2008 replacing 3.5 
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inch enterprise-class drives. It is also used in the Xbox 360 and Playstation 3 video game 
consoles. 
 
1.8 inch drives 
This form factor, was introduced by Integral Peripherals in 1993. It is increasingly used in digital 
audio players and subnotebooks. These became popular for their use in iPods and other HDD 
based MP3 players. 
 
1 inch drives 
This form factor was introduced in 1999 as IBM's Microdrive to fit inside a CF Type II slot. 
Samsung calls the same form factor "1.3 inch" drive in its product literature. Toshiba announced 
this form factor in January 2004 for use in mobile phones and similar applications, including 
SD/MMC slot compatible HDDs optimized for video storage on 4G handsets.  
  
1.2.2 The Emergence of HDD Markets 
The PCM market 
The emergence of the independent hard disk drive industry can be traced to the early 1960s, as 
companies were founded to manufacture disk drives that were plug-compatible with IBM 
equipment. This market was called the PCM Market, and until the mid 1970s, this market was 
the largest outlet for non-vertically integrated, independent disk drive firms (Christensen, 1992). 
Some of the early pioneering firms of the PCM market were Telex Corp., Storage Technology 
Corp. (STC), Control Data Corp. (CDC), Century Data, International Storage Systems (ISS), 
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Pertec, Wangco and Kennedy. These firms sold disk drives directly to users of IBM computers 
who were in need of data storage. They were product imitators rather than innovators, offering 
cheaper products than IBM. For example, IBM’s model 1311 price was $26,000 in 1962, 
compared with the compatible drives of other rivals between $8,000 to $12,000 (Christensen, 
1992). The PCM market had reached its peak at $700 million in sales in 1985, from $100 million 
in 1970. Table 1 shows the major players and its annual sales in the PCM market between 1976 
and 1986.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
The OEM market 
The OEM market emerged with the explosive growth of the minicomputer industry in the 1970s. 
While larger computer manufacturers such as IBM, DEC, Control Data, Data General, 
Burroughs, HP and Univac made most of their own drives, non-integrated firms such as Wang, 
Prime, NCR and Nixdorf in the 1970s and Apple, Commodore, Compaq, Tandy, and Sun 
Microsystems in the 1980s blossomed the OEM market for independent disk drive manufacturers. 
The OEM market grew about 25% annually between 1976 and 1998, attracting over 100 entrants 
worldwide.  Christensen (1992) categorized the OEM firms into five groups: De novo start-up 
firms, related-technology firms, related-market firms, forward integrators, and vertically 
integrated manufacturers.  
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De novo start-up firms 
These firms, mostly venture-capital backed, were founded to design and manufacture 
Winchester-technology drives, and which remained focused almost exclusively on the disk drive 
business. By 1973, all of the early firms had been acquired by larger, diversified firms. The 
majority of these firms entered after 1978.  
 
Related-technology firms  
These firms such as Storage Technology and Ampex, entered the market with experience in data 
recording technologies in other product markets.  
 
Related-market firms 
These firms such as Memorex, Diablo, Perkin Elmer and Calcomp were diversified firms that 
had several product lines made for the computer industry. While related-technology firms had 
previous experience in related technological fields, these firms had expanded their businesses in 
terms of related customers.  
 
Forward integrators 
These firms started by manufacturing major disk drive components such as read-write heads, 
which then integrated forward to the design and assembly of complete disk drives. 
 
Vertically integrated manufacturers 
These firms historically manufactured a large proportion of the world's hard disk drives. Some, 
such as DEC and Data General only manufactured for internal, captive consumption. Other firms 
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such as Control Data, Fujitsu and Hitachi competed actively in the OEM market, in addition to 
supplying their captive needs. IBM and Hewlett Packard began selling drives into the OEM 
markets in 1984 and 1985, respectively. 
 
The pioneers of the hard disk drive industry were not venture capital-backed firms, rather 
they were larger firms entering via technological or market relatedness, or by vertical integration. 
The related-market firms were the largest group until the early 1980s. The related-technology 
firms came into prominence by the mid 1980s, primarily driven by Seagate. The vertically 
integrated firms accounted for almost half of the market between 1976 and 1982. The de novo 
start-ups became leaders from the late 1980s. Table 2 shows the top ten firms ranked by market 
share.   
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
1.2.3 Firm Capabilities to Improve Technical Performance  
In the hard disk drive industry, vertically integrated, established firms took the lead in 
developing and introducing new component technology. One of the main reasons for this is that 
the development of the new component technologies was often expensive, time-consuming, and 
uncertain, requiring a vertically integrated R&D process. This process required a full range from 
basic scientific research, engineering, system design, product design, and process development. 
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Christensen (1992) gives us a good illustration of the holistic development process of the thin 
film disk technology: 
 
“From the earliest IBM disk drives, information was stored on the disk surface in 
microscopic particles of magnetizable iron oxide - the same technological approach employed in 
predecessor tape recording technologies. Efforts to improve the amount of information which 
could be stored within a given area of disk surface focused on making the iron oxide particles 
uniformly smaller; in dispersing and depositing them on the surface as uniformly as possible; and 
in orienting the particles, which tended to be needle-like in shape, vertically rather than 
horizontally on the surface to achieve greater particle density.  
In the 1970s some manufacturers sensed they were approaching the limits of recording 
density in particulate iron oxide, and began researching the use of thin film metal coatings as a 
way to further improve recording density. Thin-film process technology was already highly 
developed in the integrated circuit industry, but its application to magnetic disks presented 
substantial challenges. Applying uniform coatings on 8- and 14-inch disks, which were far larger 
than the silicon wafers used in the IC industry was an initial challenge, but making the relatively 
soft metal coatings as durable under head crash conditions as the much harder oxide coatings 
proved exceptionally difficult. Industry participants interviewed for this study estimate that 
development of thin film disk technology required approximately eight years; an industry total of 
over $1 billion spent in technology development; and a minimum expenditure of $50 million per 
firm to develop the product technology, and bring a reliable process to pilot scale.” 
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Development of the thin film head was as much an arduous process, as Christensen 
(1992) illustrates:  
 
“The original recording head design, called ferrite heads, consisted of small coils of wire 
wound around gapped ferrite (iron oxide) cores - which essentially was an electromagnet. A 
primary factor limiting recording density was the size and precision of these electromagnets on 
the recording head. Ferrite heads had to be ground mechanically to achieve desired tolerances, 
and by 1981 many felt the limits of precision for making ferrite heads had been reached. 
As early as 1965, researchers posited that by sputtering thin films of metal on the 
recording head and then using photolithography to etch electromagnets on the head's surface, 
smaller and more precise electromagnets would result, enabling more precise orientation of 
smaller magnetic domains on the disk surface. Again, although thin film photolithography was 
well-established in the semiconductor industry, its application to recording heads proved 
extraordinarily difficult. Read-write heads required much thicker films than did integrated 
circuits, and the surfaces to be coated were often at different levels, and could be inclined.” 
 
Generally, component development proceeded in four stages. First, large firms such as 
IBM would work to expand its understanding of basic scientific issues such as the physics of 
magnetic recording and the properties of new materials. The second phase would be stimulated 
by proof of concept at the large firm such as IBM, and by the leakage of that information to other 
firms. This led to a broader group of vertically integrated manufacturers - Burroughs, Control 
Data, Digital Equipment, Fujitsu, Hewlett Packard, Hitachi and NEC - to initiate their own 
development efforts. The third phase is refinement of product design, establishment of 
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manufacturing process, and incorporation into a new disk drive model. The fourth phase is 
characterized by the imitation of non-integrated disk drive manufacturers, incorporating the 
newly developed components into their products.  
 
1.2.4 Component Technology  
Because product life cycles have been relatively short and profitability within each life cycle has 
been decreasing, HDD firms were motivated to innovate quickly and focus on a novel 
combination of component technologies and design choices, rather than radical innovations 
which establish new s-curves for technological progress. Thus, setting standards at the 
component level is one thing they can potentially control and use a route to competitive 
advantage.  
Two main components that the HDD firms had focused on development were the hard 
disk platters and the read/write heads. In disk manufacturing, a thin coating is deposited on both 
sides of the platters, and the coating has a complex layered structure consisting of various 
metallic alloys. Extreme smoothness, durability, and perfection of finish are required properties 
of a hard disk platter to optimize the data storage process. Throughout the years, platters coated 
with thin metal films substituted for disks coated with particles of iron oxide.  
As for read/write heads, a major shift in the architectural technology of the head occurred 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Namely, heads made through photolithographic processes 
substituted for heads made by winding copper wire around a machined ferrite core. IBM was the 
first to explore the use of thin-film technology in 1965, with the foresight that copper wire 
technology would face a limitation in terms of grinding the ferrite to finer dimensions. Control 
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Data and Burroughs followed IBM by launching thin-film head development projects, and 
Burroughs announced a thin-film head model in 1976, although it never went into production. In 
1979, IBM introduced its Model 3340 with thin-film heads. By 1999, 19 of 20 firms had 
incorporated thin-film heads in their products. Table 3 shows the numbers of firms introducing 
models equipped with thin-film heads from 1987 to 1999.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Meanwhile, there was another substitute technology to the copper wire technology, called 
the metal in the gap (MIG). This technology gave improvement to the ferrite head by placing 
metal in the gap between the two ferrite block’s on the head surface. Although the MIG 
technology yielded almost equivalent performance to the thin film, the industry had eventually 
moved to the thin-film technology by the late 1980s. Figure 4 shows metal-coated disks for 
particulate oxide-coated disks, and Figure 5 shows the substitution of innovative head 
technology for conventional ferrite head technology.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Switching from the copper wire technology to the thin-film technology was not an easy 
task for following firms, since the change required other technologies. For instance, according to 
Christensen (1992), the development of barium-doped ferrite greatly increased the physical 
strength of the material, permitting the heads to be ground to much finer, more precise 
dimensions without chipping or cracking. The development of lapping processes permitted 
manufacturers to grind the ferrite cores even more finely. These new technologies required 
fundamentally different sets of resources and capabilities, including different sets of engineering 
competencies, manufacturing equipment, manufacturing flow systems.  Following is the time 
frame of key technology and market events5
• First Hard Disk (1956): IBM's RAMAC is introduced. It has a capacity of about 5 MB, 
stored on 50 24" disks. Its areal density is a mere 2,000 bits per square inch and its data 
throughput 8,800 bits/s. 
.  
• First Air Bearing Heads (1962): IBM's model 1301 lowers the flying height of the heads 
to 250 microinches. It has a 28 MB capacity on half as many heads as the original 
RAMAC, and increases both areal density and throughput by about 1000%. 
• First Removable Disk Drive (1965): IBM's model 2310 is the first disk drive with a 
removable disk pack. While many PC users think of removable hard disks as being a 
modern invention, in fact they were very popular in the 1960s and 1970s. 
• First Ferrite Heads (1966): IBM's model 2314 is the first hard disk to use ferrite core 
heads, the first type later used on PC hard disks. 
                                                 
5 Excerpt from http://www.storagereview.com/guide/histFirsts.html 
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• First Modern Hard Disk Design (1973): IBM's model 3340, nicknamed the "Winchester", 
is introduced. With a capacity of 60 MB it introduces several key technologies that lead 
to it being considered by many the ancestor of the modern disk drive. 
• First Thin Film Heads (1979): IBM's model 3370 is the first with thin film heads, which 
would for many years be the standard in the PC industry. 
• First Eight-Inch Form Factor Disk (1979): IBM's model 3310 is the first disk drive with 
8" platters, greatly reduced in size from the 14" that had been the standard for over a 
decade. 
• First 5.25" Form Factor Disk (1980): Seagate's ST-506 is the first drive in the 5.25" form 
factor, used in the earliest PCs. 
• First 3.5" Form Factor Disk Drive (1983): Rodime introduces the RO352, the first disk 
drive to use the 3.5" form factor, which became one of the most important industry 
standards. 
• First Expansion Card Disk Drive (1985): Quantum introduces the Hardcard, a 10.5 MB 
hard disk mounted on an ISA expansion card for PCs that were originally built without a 
hard disk. This product put Quantum "on the map" so to speak. 
• First Voice Coil Actuator 3.5" Drive (1986): Conner Peripherals introduces the CP340, 
the first disk drive to use a voice coil actuator. 
• First "Low-Profile" 3.5" Disk Drive (1988): Conner Peripherals introduces the CP3022, 
which was the first 3.5" drive to use the reduced 1" height now called "low profile" and 
the standard for modern 3.5" drives. 
• First 2.5" Form Factor Disk Drive (1988): PrairieTek introduces a drive using 2.5" 
platters. This size would later become a standard for portable computing. 
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• First Drive to use Magnetoresistive Heads and PRML Data Decoding (1990): IBM's 
model 681 (Redwing), an 857 MB drive, is the first to use MR heads and PRML. 
• First Thin Film Disks (1991): IBM's "Pacifica" mainframe drive is the first to replace 
oxide media with thin film media on the platter surface. 
• First 1.8" Form Factor Disk Drive (1991): Integral Peripherals' 1820 is the first hard disk 
with 1.8" platters, later used for PC-Card disk drives. 
• First 1.3" Form Factor Disk Drive (1992): Hewlett Packard's C3013A is the first 1.3" 
drive. 
 
 
 The HDD industry is a good setting to examine how firms faced with swift-paced 
technological demands manage their product innovation activities. Especially, this context is 
ideal in looking at how firms deal with competitive threats by influencing competitors’ R&D 
efforts of when to invest in certain component technologies that might shape the technology 
frontiers of the industry.  
   
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section briefly reviews literature on knowledge disclosure and competitive threats that 
provides the foundation for this dissertation. I later develop arguments to explain why and how 
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leading firms in the hard disk drive industry disclose knowledge in order to prolong their 
knowledge-based competencies by promoting imitation and delaying substitution. 
1.3.1 Motivation of Knowledge Disclosure 
A firm’s knowledge disclosure activity ranges from no disclosure to full disclosure, depending 
on the firm’s motivations (James, 2007). Following is a review of extant literature on the 
motivations of knowledge disclosure. Although prior research provides useful theoretical 
underpinnings, it does not adequately explain the influence of a firm’s knowledge disclosure on 
its rival’s competitive strategy in terms of imitation and substitution, and also how firms may 
utilize knowledge disclosure as a mechanism to prolong their knowledge-based competencies. 
Two streams have mainly considered the motivations of knowledge disclosure - the finance and 
accounting literature, and the innovation literature. 
1.3.2 Finance and Accounting Literature 
Capital market transaction theory argues information asymmetry impedes the efficient allocation 
of resources in a capital market economy, and disclosure by firms geared towards investors play 
an important role in mitigating these problems (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Due to information 
differences and conflicting incentives, investors might undervalue “good” projects and overvalue 
“bad” projects, leading to the inefficiency in capital markets and potential market breakdowns 
(Akerlof, 1970; Healy & Palepu, 2001). Also, firms will view making public equity or debt 
offers to be costly for existing shareholders. Thus, firms have incentives to disclose knowledge 
by themselves or by intermediary institutions in order to mitigate the information asymmetry and 
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optimize any contracting between the firms and their investors or their creditors and reduce the 
firm’s cost of external financing (Christie & Zimmerman, 1994; Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).  
In a competition viewpoint, theoretical models in corporate finance and accounting 
suggest that firms are reluctant to disclose information that consequently leads to the increase of 
imitation risk (James, 2007; Yosha, 1995). Namely, firms will disclose knowledge to reduce 
financing costs only when the expected positive effect of disclosure on market value is higher 
than the strategic costs, such as reduction in present value of future cash flows as a consequence 
of imitation (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). However, prior studies show that firms 
have other strategic motivations beyond lowering financing costs. As James (2007) suggests, the 
theories lack empirical support of the influence of financing versus strategic concerns on the 
decision to disclose knowledge. A strategic view of knowledge disclosure has been considered 
more extensively in the innovation literature, as explained in the following section. 
1.3.3 Innovation Literature  
The basic assumption with respect to knowledge disclosure in the innovation literature, as with 
the finance and accounting literature, is that firms face trade-offs when disclosing strategic 
information. Namely, firms that voluntarily disclose information about R&D projects, in order to 
reduce any information asymmetry between its investors and consequently achieve lower 
financing costs, face the risk of increased competition by rivals that utilize the disclosed 
information to improve their R&D efforts. Due to disclosure and subsequent spillovers, rivals 
may imitate or make a discovery with no extra cost (De Fraja, 1993). Moreover, knowledge 
disclosures may act as signals of opportunity, inviting other competitors to continue R&D 
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projects when they might have otherwise dropped out of the race (Aoki, 1991; Lippman & 
McCardle, 1987). As a consequence, firms that disclose knowledge may lose their profits from 
their innovations. Thus, firms will weigh the benefits of disclosure against the potential costs 
(Choi, 1991; De Fraja, 1993) and will disclose knowledge to a greater degree only when the 
benefits exceed the costs (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983). Beyond the motivation to lower 
financing costs, scholars examining firms’ innovative efforts have examined the strategic 
motivations behind knowledge disclosure. 
For example, Coff, Lee, & Hayward (2008) suggested that firms may disclose 
information about technological breakthroughs either when they need complementary resources, 
when they need to garner attention in order to fully exploit the advantage, or when there is 
managerial opportunism whereby managers stand to gain personally by controlling the timing of 
key information releases. The first motivation depicts the need for smaller firms to disclose when 
they have new technologies but do not necessarily possess the resources to carry out the later 
stages of development or marketing. The second motivation depicts knowledge disclosure when 
firms either seek to exploit market opportunities, technology market opportunities, or private 
knowledge trading with alliance partners. The third motivation depicts an agency problem where 
managers may disclose information to profit personally through insider trading. Harhoff (1996) 
and Harhoff et al. (2003) also argued that firms may increase the appropriable value of R&D 
investments by disclosing technologies to potential licensing partners. Also, Tripsas (1997) 
contended that by disclosing knowledge, firms may gain partnerships with other firms that 
possess resources and capabilities that enable the commercialization of an innovation, including 
complementary manufacturing and marketing capabilities.  
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With respect to disclosure targeted to rivals, Penin (2007) suggested several motivations: 
to nurture an environment of openness, to implement the innovation as a standard, to prevent 
other firms from patenting the disclosed innovation, and to trigger reputation effects.6
Meanwhile, prior studies have suggested that there are contingencies to the determinants 
of knowledge disclosure. For example, firms that possess superior resources and capabilities that 
are necessary to develop and commercialize an innovation may lower imitation risk since rivals 
may find it difficult to imitate and reap profit from their innovative ideas (Teece, 1986). 
Competitors that possess relatively inferior resources and capabilities are likely to have lower 
  Based on 
game theoretical logic, nurturing an environment of openness refers to the reciprocal pattern of 
knowledge disclosure among rivals when one firm is not capable of solving all technological 
problems. Here, knowledge disclosure is acknowledged as a tacit agreement, where the creation 
of an environment of openness and implicit collaboration is rendered possible mostly by 
repetition of interactions (Von Hippel, 1987). Implementing the innovation as a standard refers 
to firms disclosing partially to decrease the cost for rivals to adopt the innovation of the 
disclosing firm. Preventing rivals from patenting refers to knowledge disclosure mostly aimed at 
the prevention of rivals patenting the innovation while saving patent application costs. Failure to 
disclose knowledge increases the risk of being excluded from the industry by a rival patent 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Triggering reputation effects refers to firms gaining benefits from 
knowledge disclosure, increased demand due to the reputation of a firm disclosing its 
innovativeness, deterring potential rivals from entering their market niches, gaining easier access 
to financial markets and public funding, and facilitating R&D cooperation with potential partners 
by signaling its competencies.  
                                                 
6 Penin (2007) has also introduced other motivations of knowledge disclosure towards suppliers and customers, but I 
focus on knowledge disclosure towards rivals in this study.  
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absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990) to absorb and process the disclosed 
knowledge and therefore may not become as effective as the leaders in the competition. 
Mansfield et al. (1981) showed that innovations were imitated at roughly 65 percent of the 
innovator’s costs except when firms possessed superior technical and other capabilities necessary 
to commercialize the innovation. In terms of imitation risk and the propensity to disclose 
knowledge, James (2007) and James & Shaver (2008) showed that technological 
interdependencies and a firm’s stock of essential technologies have a positive effect on a firm’s 
subsequent knowledge disclosure. In addition, they show that firms in an industry with stronger 
patent protection will disclose more knowledge than firms in an industry with weaker patent 
protection. For interdependencies, they argued that firms with R&D projects that draw on 
interdependent technologies would disclose more since they face lower potential competition, 
due to the fact that imitators lack internal technical skills that are necessary to develop competing 
products. For a firm’s stock of essential technologies, they argued that firms that own critical 
technologies would disclose more since they have the capability to achieve expected profits 
faster than potential rivals. For the strength of patent protection differences, they argued that 
firms operating in strong patent protection industries would disclose more since they would be 
less concerned of profitability reduction due to imitation. Namely, there would be higher 
imitation costs due to stronger legal remedies for the disclosing firm.  
In sum, firms disclose knowledge when there is low imitation risk or when there are 
potentially greater benefits of knowledge disclosure when compared to the risk of imitation of 
rivals. While firms may have strategic motivations and benefits of knowledge disclosure, prior 
studies are silent on how rivals react to a firm’s strategic knowledge disclosure and how 
knowledge disclosure may affect the sustainability of a firm’s competence. Namely, it is unclear 
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on how knowledge disclosure affects the risk of substitution by rivals compared to the risk of 
imitation. The next section develops a theory that explains why and how firms might promote 
imitation, rather than avoiding it, in order to prevent substitution and prolong their technological 
playing field. 
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2.0  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
While leading firms in high-velocity markets, such as the hard disk drive industry, are pressured 
to search for new innovation opportunities, they are also trying to exploit their established 
technological competencies. However, they are not alone in the innovation race. Competing 
incumbents and new entrants constantly search for innovations that might erode the leader’s 
imitation barriers or disrupt the market, threatening their enthronement and even their very 
existence. The question for the leading firm is how to effectively address the two forms of 
competition. In this section I develop my hypotheses by explaining the motivations of knowledge 
disclosure by the leaders, the motivations of imitation by the laggards when knowledge is 
disclosed, and how the leaders may succeed in prolonging their current technological playing 
field while winning the innovation race and setting the standard by introducing next-generation 
products quicker. 
2.1 WHY AND HOW LEADERS WOULD DISCLOSE KNOWLEDGE 
As aforementioned in the introduction section, leading firms that are successful in technology-
intense industries balance the need to change frequently yet perform reliably within each product 
generation, while addressing threats of imitation and substitution. In this section, I explain the 
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conditions that would motivate leading firms to disclose knowledge in order to promote imitation 
while delaying or preventing substitution.  
First, in high-velocity and technology-intense markets, there is a need for leading firms to 
develop and introduce next-generation innovations that would establish the technological 
standards. As expressed as the “battle for technological dominance against other technological 
designs (Suarez, 2004),” in these environments, technological standards are constantly changing, 
and there is a high level of uncertainty of what would be accepted as the next-generation 
innovations (Adner & Zemsky, 2006; D'Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). Although they need not 
be superior in terms of performance (Adner, 2002; Christensen, 1997), the next-generation 
innovations may easily and unexpectedly disrupt the markets and displace the leading firms that 
lag behind in the innovation race, mostly due to organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 
1984; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Miller & Chen, 1994). Thus, an imperative motivation for the 
leading firm is to gain dominance in technological designs by quickly introducing next-
generation innovative products.  
Second, before technology standards are set, there is a need to prolong the leaders’ 
technological playing field in order to exploit their established knowledge-based competencies. 
While this prolonging is achieved through technology dominance of the leaders, the notion of 
dominance is related to studies on the sociology of science and technology (Suarez, 2004). 
Sociological perspectives argue that contacts will drive the criteria that inventors use to evaluate 
new approaches, compare their performance potential, and hence will heavily influence their 
perceptions of which offers the greatest opportunities (Greve, 1996; Greve & Taylor, 2000; 
Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). Leaders may want to affect the emergence of 
a dominant design (or standardization of design) in the market by influencing the attention 
 30 
(Ocasio, 1997) of laggards of where to search and what to search for with respect to innovation 
opportunities. By doing this, they may also encourage investment into complementary products 
and industry infrastructure, promoting investments which are necessary for production 
economies of scale (Spencer, 2003; Utterback & Suaraz, 1993). Also, Spencer (2003) argued that 
by influencing the priorities of players, the firm can persuade innovators along all technological 
trajectories to compete on the firm’s own terms. She argued that an institutional environment sets 
the framework for market transactions and provides important resources for economic actors, 
legitimizing organizational forms and technologies. According to institutional theorists, agents 
play a critical role in shaping the forces of institutions and laying out normative standards in an 
industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983 [1991]; Selznick, 1957, 1996). In emerging high-technology 
industries, a core component of the institutional environment is the technological standard of a 
product’s development, and the technological advances of firms co-evolve with the institutional 
environment (Spencer, 2003). Namely, when laggards imitate the leading firms by disclosing 
knowledge, the leaders can increase their legitimacy by shaping the institutional environment in 
favor of their own technology.  
Interviews with managers of leading hard disk drive firms show that it is common for 
firms to let new technological ideas float around, creating a “buzz” amongst the technology 
communities to promote the validity of their innovations. When the next-generation of dominant 
designs are not solidified, firms encourage various players, including their rivals, to adopt and 
imitate their technologies. A former Seagate engineer said: 
 
“If you try to innovate entirely on your own, you run a very high risk of having other 
companies choose another path. You want your technology accepted before your 
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competitors get there (achieve similar performance measures) via other paths 
(substitution), in which case R&D dollars you have invested in your own approach could 
become wasted.”   
 
A Seagate technology manager also mentioned: 
 
“If you go down one path (of technology development) and commit to it, you are 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars going down that path. It's a big bet (and high 
risk) if you are on your own. You're reducing some risk by letting some information out 
in the public domain. You'll get feedback because people will talk to you. And frequently 
they'll come up with solutions your own team hasn't thought of yet….You want to be 
aware of what is being discussed. Eventually, they (the community including rivals) will 
accept and use your technology.” 
 
Namely, leading firms want to persuade their communities (those including competing 
rivals and potential new entrants) the legitimacy of their technologies against competing ones by 
encouraging rivals to incorporate the technologies into their products. One might view this 
promotion of imitations as a means to delay or prevent substitution. This makes sense for leading 
firms since they are making huge investments in their technologies and would not want to see 
them knocked off the market. 
Leading firms may disclose knowledge to promote imitation when they are searching for 
new markets. For example, Memorex, a leader in 14-inch disk drives took an “open technology” 
policy, disclosing the electronic and mechanical specifications publicly available and freely 
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usable by its competitors. Seagate also followed the business model of standardized open 
technology, in order to promote their technology in their hard drives so as to establish new 
markets for unproven technologies (Hughes, 2006). Ironically, Seagate had suffered in 
competition in later years during the transition from the perpendicular recording7
 
 to potential 
future technologies for not disclosing their research on Heat Assisted Magnetic Recording 
(HAMR), while competitors would introduce other technologies and capture markets. According 
to a former Seagate technology manager: 
“There are three competing technologies that would be the next generation moving from 
perpendicular recording in the heads (Heat Assisted Magnetic Recording, Bit-Patterned 
Media Recording and Two-Dimensional Magnetic Recording), particularly for hard 
drives that goes in emerging products, such as media-related electronics…Seagate had 
been investing heavily in HAMR. Investing in these technologies and choosing whether 
to share or not is a strategic decision. Seagate had done a lot of work on HAMR, and the 
managers were reluctant to share HAMR technology with competitors. However, the rest 
of the industry was working on BPMR. Eventually, they (Seagate) felt the rest of the 
world going to another direction. If they had talked about what they have done on HAMR, 
the industry would have flocked into HAMR at that point in time. Seagate later on 
                                                 
7 Perpendicular recording (or Perpendicular Magnetic Recording, PMR) is a technology for data recording on hard 
disks. It was first proven advantageous in 1976 by Shun-ichi Iwasaki, then professor of the Tohoku University in 
Japan, and first commercially implemented in 2005. Perpendicular recording can deliver more than three times the 
storage density  of traditional longitudinal recording. There was some interest in using the system in floppy disks in 
the 1980s, but the technology was never reliable. Since about 2005 the technology has come into use for hard disk 
drives. Hard disk technology with longitudinal recording has an estimated limit of 100 to 200 gigabit per square inch 
due to the superparamagnetic effect, though this estimate is constantly changing. Perpendicular recording is 
predicted to allow information densities of up to around 1 Tbit/sq. inch (1000 Gbit/sq. inch). As of March 2009 
drives with densities of 300-400Gb/in2 were available commercially, and there have been perpendicular recording 
demonstrations of 600-800Gb/sq. inch (Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpendicular_recording.). 
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continued to go down with HAMR and BPMR, both of which required huge R&D, and 
they lost a huge advantage in competition.” 
 
It should be noted that firms do not disclose all knowledge, neither do they disclose 
regardless of the characteristics of the technological knowledge they tend to disclose. As an 
industry analyst states: 
 
“The HDD firms that disclose or share technology do not take the open policy in a market 
stage where products have been fully developed. Rather, they open themselves when the 
technology is in a nascent stage, or when the products are not launched yet.” 
 
In the same light, a firm may decide to reveal its knowledge because its technology is on 
the frontier and thus it will not detract from the profits from a product innovation (Nelson, 1992). 
In this case, revealing technology does not provide a formidable threat because “imitation takes 
time, and by the time the imitation is achieved the initial innovator may have achieved a further 
improvement and extended the technological frontier.” (Penin, 2007: p. 333) 
The third need of the leading firms is to delay or prevent substitution by laggards, trading 
off with the erosion of imitation barriers to some extent. While leaders are constantly faced with 
imitation and substitution, the two competitive actions by rivals pose different threats. Namely, 
while substitution by competing laggards may not succeed in every case, when it does succeed, it 
poses a formidable threat to the leaders by disrupting the markets and displacing the existing 
innovations (Christensen, 1997). Proponents of resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) suggest that firms can 
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prevent imitation with resources that are not easily identified or controlled. However, setting up 
and maintaining imitation barriers is not a sufficient condition to prevent substitution from 
rivalry (McEvily et al., 2000). Competitors can pose substitution threats and disrupt the playing 
field of competition by overturning established business models and rendering incumbents’ 
capabilities obsolete (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Moreover, it 
has been argued in prior studies that substitution threats are more formidable than imitation 
threats. For example, Yoo (2005) showed that late movers’ resource substitution in the computer 
industry had a relatively larger impact than resource imitation on their returns as well as those of 
the first movers. Yoo argued that substitution strategies from late movers oftentimes reshape the 
competitive landscape, enabling them to overtake the pioneers over time. The higher impact of 
substitution is more vivid in high-technology markets (Golder & Tellis, 1993), of which the hard 
disk drive industry is a part. Janney and Dess (2006), give caution with respect to only focusing 
on imitation, contending that rivals faced with imitation barriers may seek out substitute 
resources, and eventually leave the focal firm more vulnerable in different areas of competition. 
Ma and Karri (2005) emphasized that preventing both imitation and substitution threats are key 
to a leading firm’s success, but substitution may be more formidable since they are not easily 
detected by incumbents when new firms enter the market. They considered imitation as 
“chipping away” at the incumbents’ advantageous positions and substitution as “moving the 
mountain and the sea,” making the leaders’ games irrelevant and their corresponding core 
competencies obsolete (p. 72).  
Moreover, for the leading firm, oftentimes it is difficult to anticipate the potential 
substitution strategies of its rivals. For example, Ma and Karri (2005) argued that incumbents 
may not identify the substitutors as serious challengers due to the seemingly ‘non-threatening’ 
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manner at the time of entry. In the same line, Christensen (1993; 1997; 2004; 1998) contended 
that business models from new entrants via substitution (disruptive innovation) are too small in 
terms of investment value or irrelevant to the incumbents’ interests that the incumbents would 
not take competitive actions in entry stages. However, once the substituting business models or 
products have gained adequate market share in the industry, it is mostly too late for the 
incumbents to successfully react since they would have different resources, processes, and values 
that would not fit with the demanding expectations. Thus, regarding the formidable threat of 
substitution, leaders may have an incentive to disclose knowledge, fostering imitation and 
mitigate laggards’ incentives to substitute. 
2.2 LAGGARDS’ INCENTIVES TO IMITATE KNOWLEDGE-DISCLOSING 
LEADERS 
Prior studies have considered the motivations of interfirm imitation. For example, theories of 
organizational learning argue that imitating firms may learn from the successes and failures of 
early movers without having to bear the costs of experimentation (Dutton & Freedman, 1985; 
Haunschild, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). Competitors are constantly searching for innovation 
opportunities, and an imitation strategy is a good stepping stone to enter markets or to launch 
new products, since it reduces uncertainty of demand. Strategic choice theorists suggest that 
first-movers in the competitive dynamics setting would have absorbed the market risk associated 
with product development and thus the late-movers may take advantage of the fact by imitating 
the products of the first-movers (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).  In the hard disk drive 
industry, when a new component technology is introduced, it is not clear how large or how fast 
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the market for the new technology would grow or whether it would serve the same customer base. 
For example, the market need for size reduction in hard disks have demanded better read/write 
heads with new architectures that may result in improvement of read/write speed. In turn, smaller 
size had derived new and unexpected demand growth such as PC computers for the 14 inch, 5.25 
inch and 3.5 inch, and camcorders and pocket PCs for smaller hard drives. During the ‘change of 
demand’ periods many new entering laggards had failed by providing their own technologies and 
missing the moving targets. For the laggard, substitution may be riskier than imitation because 
the potential value of new technology (or new products) is not known and substantial effort may 
be required to persuade customers to switch from existing products. Particularly for new entrants, 
even when imitation may carry a competitive risk from leading firms who have become 
especially adept and efficient in using the dominant technology, entering markets through 
imitation may be quicker and less costly than entering via substitution (Barney, 1991; Powell et 
al., 2006). Namely, uncertainty reduction is a major factor which drives the adoption of 
technology (Rogers, 1995).  
Institutional theory suggests that firms copy practices adopted by others in order to 
acquire legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The knowledge of technologies or products 
that are disclosed or shared by leading firms signals the fact that they have already been proven 
within the organization and that they are ready for the market. Imitating these technologies or 
products would give the laggards the legitimacy that they are providing similar value-added 
products. The laggards will be suspicious of any attempt from the leaders to mislead them onto 
unpromising technology trajectories. The technological issues are evident (e.g. more bits per disk 
space or faster access speed), but the dominant technological standards that are accepted in the 
market to achieve the performance aspects are uncertain. In this sense following the buzz - which 
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in some cases is laid out by the leading firms via publications, patents, and other channels - is the 
reasonable strategy to pursue for the laggards since it assures legitimacy. Note that imitating the 
firms in terms of technology does not equate to losing market share directly, since market share 
has other underlying mechanisms such as cost and price per unit. Namely, laggards are not 
misled into imitation, rather they are persuaded to take what they believe are legitimate paths to 
what would be accepted in the market. 
Also, rivals are constantly searching for strategic information (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002), but this information may be costly. Moreover, due to cognitive 
limitations, managers may not know how or where to search for critical information, resulting in 
firms to follow boundedly rational routines (Coff et al., 2008; Cyert & March, 1963). 
Furthermore, due to high levels of competitive risk and uncertainty, information asymmetries 
among firms remains between “what is known by the inventor and what is seen and understood 
by others.” (Coff et al., 2008: 8) Thus, managers often search for information and solutions in 
familiar technological territories, engaging in “local search,” in order to understand and 
assimilate the information into their innovation efforts (Levinthal & March, 1993; Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003; Stuart & Podolny, 1996).  
 
An industry analyst and former Western Digital engineer stated: 
 
“We were always on a lookout for what the industry leaders were laying out every 
quarter. We looked at publications, patents, announcements and even cooperated with 
them to see where the frontiers were. We didn’t want to shoot in the wrong way in terms 
of R&D.” 
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A technology manager at Samsung Electronics mentioned: 
 
“We played ‘follow the leader’ for a while, when anticipated a change in milestone 
technologies, such as form factor (size) changes or areal density leaps. Since directions 
were uncertain, we figured that it was at least safe to imitate them…..at least until we 
found ways to leap frog.” 
 
In these conditions, knowledge disclosure by leading firms may provide opportunities for 
the rivals to increase their familiarity with the promising innovations, meaning that their search 
activities may be either refined or broadened to meet the increasing technological demands of the 
market. For example, Seagate’s open policy through technical committees on interface standards 
related to the AT Attachment (ATA) storage, which is utilized as the disk drive interface on most 
personal and mobile computers, served as a pool of conversations, networking and joint 
development with rivals. These committees, mostly initialized by leading firms such as Seagate, 
were utilized not only to acknowledge the technological requirements to enhance storage 
capabilities of hard disk drives, but to understand the pathways of the leader’s technological 
development and influence focus of rivals’ R&D efforts8
                                                 
8 Based on conversations with hard disk drive managers and engineers. For example, Seagate was a major player in 
initiating technical committees such as T10 (
. One of the potential effects of these 
open policies is that firms may imitate the knowledge disclosing firms at multiple levels, 
including technologies, components, products, and even business models, since they become 
more familiar with the main issues that “make the buzz.” Consequently, what leading firms such 
as Seagate are expecting by disclosing knowledge through the open policy channels is to 
www.t10.org) and T13 (www.t13.org).  
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promote component innovations that will sustain their current architectures in the hard disk 
drives.  
In sum, laggards have high motivations to imitate the leaders’ component technology that 
has been disclosed since: 1) it would cost them less to implement that technology; 2) the laggards 
can relatively easily implement the component technology since they would have a better 
understanding of it; and 3) the laggards might reduce the market risk of not meeting demand 
when introducing their own alternative technologies. Thus, the following should hold: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Leading firms’ knowledge disclosure of core technologies is positively 
associated with the likelihood of laggards’ technology imitation.  
 
Leading firms have the incentive to incorporate new component technologies into their 
own products quicker, since early incorporation of new technologies promotes faster learning. 
Moving down the learning curve quicker would render the leading firm a higher probability of 
prolonging its technological lead once rivals do start adopting the new technology. In high-
velocity environments, firms are constantly competing for technological standards, and the 
earlier a next-generation technology is incorporated in its products the better the chance of 
gaining dominance against other substitute technologies. For example, the hard disk drive 
industry is characterized by rapid technological change, extremely short life-cycles, intense 
competition, and rapidly falling prices. Along with cost and price pressures from the major 
consumers of hard disk drives, the computer industry, these conditions have pushed firms to 
introduce smaller hard drives with higher capacity. The rapid changes in these technology 
standards (e.g. capacity, size [form factor], and read/write head architecture) have been 
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problematic for many firms, and most of them have not survived the transitions. Firms that were 
late to the market with new innovations thus suffered a severe revenue penalty, preventing them 
from finding any customers and eventually being forced to absorb R&D costs and start 
alternative developments, or to exit the industry altogether (McKendrick et al., 2000).  
 By promoting imitation, leaders would have the lead time to develop new component 
technologies and incorporate them into their next-generation products. Due to the information 
asymmetry between the leading firms and the imitating laggards in terms of the value of the 
innovation, imitators incur a cost of monitoring the innovation and its application among leading 
firms. When rivals in established markets base their strategy on imitation, their technological 
innovations incorporated in their products tend to be based on incremental change (Ireland et al., 
2003; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). This means that they will compete with established firms on 
similar architectures and performance measures. Established, leading firms will already have had 
experience and efficiency, especially when dominant designs emerge throughout the evolution of 
the industry (Utterback & Suaraz, 1993). Imitation will reinforce the value of the leading firms’ 
capabilities (Reinganum, 1982) and as a consequence they will have dominance in terms of 
price- and time-based competition (Christensen et al., 1998). This would allow the leading firms 
to develop the next generation of technologies and introduce quicker innovative products that 
had incorporated these technologies. Thus, the following would hold: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Leading firms’ introduction of products with next-generation technologies 
occurs earlier as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase. 
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 Moreover, when laggards imitate new components in the leader’s next-generation 
products, leaders can “lock-in” laggards by focusing on the leader’s technology that has been 
disclosed. In the context of locking-in customers or suppliers, McEvily et al. (2002) considers 
lock-in as a strategy in the context of customers or suppliers making “firm-specific investments 
in skills, knowledge, equipment, and/or organizational processes to use or support a firm's 
products. (p. 301)” Customers or suppliers incur a significant cost when shifting their business to 
other firms, since existing assets lose value and since new skills and equipment may be necessary 
to use the other firm’s product. Thus, it is expected that the firm's exchange partners will delay 
purchasing, or developing for, a substitute technology (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). I 
argue that not only can leading firms lock-in customers or suppliers, but they can also lock-in 
competing laggards and delay their introduction of new component technologies in their next-
generation products. Firms that lag behind in terms of technological capability are constrained 
with their ability to fully explore alternative component technologies. Developing components 
based on next-generation technologies required investment in a range of various development 
processes, costing time and financial resources. Laggards in the hard disk drive industry, 
compared to the leading firms, are less likely to possess the leverage to simultaneously search for 
alternative technologies and incorporate them into their products, once they imitated the leading 
firms’ new component technologies. Namely, laggards may lose incentive to incorporate new 
component technologies developed by their own development efforts when they imitate the 
leading firm’s disclosed technologies. Consequently, by disclosing knowledge, the leading firms 
may prolong their technological playing field by quickly introducing their own technologies due 
to the imitation of the laggards. Thus, the following hypothesis would hold:   
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Hypothesis 3: Laggards’ introduction of products with next-generation technologies 
occurs later as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase. 
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3.0  SAMPLE AND DATA 
The hard disk drive market is an ideal setting for my study as technologies change rapidly, 
creating new opportunities for innovative firms, which firms must manage vigilantly. For 
example, the capacity of the hard disk drive (HDD) roughly doubles every six months, and the 
product life cycle of the HDD itself is six quarters at most (Kumar & McCaffrey, 2003). It 
should be noted that I focus on the technology competition at the component level to examine the 
dynamics of leading firms’ knowledge disclosure and laggards’ competitive response. First, 
components in hard disk drives are complex and risky, and developing substitute components 
require fundamentally different sets of resources and capabilities, including different sets of 
engineering competencies, manufacturing equipment, manufacturing flow systems (Christensen 
1998). Components such as the read/write heads and platters are the core components of R&D 
for the HDD firms. Namely, most drives are similar in terms of their form factor, but it is the 
components that are the dominant differentiating factor in terms of performance. Second, 
component innovation is a key focus of firms in a range of industries such as main frames 
(Iansiti & Khanna, 1995), photolithographic alignment equipment (Henderson, 1993), and 
cameras (Windrum & Birchenhall, 1998). In the hard disk drive industry, millions of dollars are 
invested in novel component technologies to create the next wave of technological opportunity, 
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which will redefine the paths going forward.  Hence, developing new component technologies is 
a means to shape the playing field across product generations.9
Another reason the hard disk drive industry is ideal to test my hypotheses is that it is a 
weak information protection (IP) industry. Namely, in a weak IP setting, there are various ways 
to invent around a component technology via substitution. In the hard disk drive industry, the 
knowledge appropriation value of patents have been low, meaning that firms were reluctant to 
patent their technologies for the purpose of protecting their technology-based performance 
advantage (Lerner, 1997). The implication of this is that when there are multiple ways to 
improve performance measures (e.g. areal density) IP protection from patents is weak. Thus, I 
emphasize that patenting in the hard disk drive industry has more disclosing effects rather than 
appropriation effects.   
   
Data for the measurements were obtained from four sources: Disk/Trend Reports, 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, Thomson Reuters’ SDC database, United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) database, and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) version of the USPTO database (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). For constructing my 
sample, I first identified the population of firms in the hard disk drive industry based on the 
Disk/Trend Reports from years 1987 to 1999. The report has been the leading market research 
publication in the disk drive industry, and has been used in various studies with respect to this 
industry (Christensen & Bower, 1996). It contains extensive data on product models, sales, 
technology and firm characteristics, all of which were used in this study. Although the 
Disk/Trend Report contains disk drive data from 1976, I included years from 1987 since years 
before did not contain consistent data on component technology that was of interest of this study. 
                                                 
9 Refer to the Appendix for a detailed explanation of how hard disk drive manufacturers focus on component level 
technologies in R&D. 
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Also, the alliance data for hard disk drive firms from the SDC database starts from 1987. I 
filtered the observations of products of firms in several ways. First, following Lerner (1997), I 
deleted two specialized subclasses of drives whose specifications may not be comparable to 
others: "rugged" systems designed for military applications and hard-disk cards that are installed 
in expansion slots of personal computers. Second, a single drive may have alternative 
configurations. In this case, I treated each as a different hard drive. Third, firms would either 
acquire or become acquired by other firms. In this case, I treated the acquired and the acquirer as 
the same firm when the two firms were observed simultaneously within the one year window of 
my analysis.  
For the categorization of leader and laggard, I relied on the Disk/Trend reports for 
technological level of each product (areal density) and also sales data at the firm level. Although 
the sales data are largely estimated, they are regarded by industry experts as being of high quality 
(Lerner, 1997). 
For information on patenting by firms operating in the disk drive industry, I relied on data 
drawn from the USPTO database of patents and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Patent Citations Data File (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2002). As Hoetker & Agarwal 
(2007) notes, the choice of patent classes to include in my sample involves a trade-off. Namely, 
including a broader range of patent classes means that a sample will include more inventive 
activity and will represent more patents. On the other hand, a broader the range of patent classes 
implies that the patents will have application outside one’s industry of interest. Following 
Hoetker & Argarwal (2007), I adopted a conservative strategy and restricted the pool of patents 
to the class most relevant to hard disks: U.S. patent classification code 360, dynamic magnetic 
information storage or retrieval. Moreover, I filtered the sample further by searching for 
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keywords that contained technology descriptions of the core components of the hard disk drive, 
such as “read/write head,” “platter,” “recording material,” “substrate,” “voice coil,” and “thin 
film.” This filtering would ensure that the knowledge that has been disclosed by leading firms 
would be relevant to the core components that they had developed through R&D activities.  
For strategic alliances among the hard disk drives firms, I used Thompson Reuters’ SDC 
database. This database has been commonly used for strategic alliance studies.  
For Hypothesis 1, the level of analysis is firm-pairs of leading firms and laggards. 
Leading firms and laggards were categorized based on annual market share10
For Hypothesis 2 and, the level of analysis is the annual top ten leading firms in terms of 
market share in the hard disk drive industry, and an observation was made whenever a leading 
firm introduced a product that incorporated next-generation technologies. Observations were 
dropped due to missing values in the measurements of any of the variables, resulting in 1,725 
observations for the sample.  
. On average, the 
top ten leaders accounted for approximately 80% of market share each year. Firms that did not 
report financial data for measuring R&D intensity (R&D expenditure over total assets) which 
was used as the proxy for absorptive capacity were dropped from the sample. Firms that lacked 
controls were also excluded, resulting in 746 observations for the sample.   
For Hypothesis 3, the level of analysis is the annual top ten leading firms in terms of 
market share in the hard disk drive industry, and an observation was made whenever a laggard 
introduced a product that incorporated next-generation technologies. Observations were dropped 
                                                 
10 I also considered leaders in terms of technology, measured by the average performance measures of the hard disk 
drives (e.g. bit per square inch, areal density, reading time), but there was no significant differences in the analyses. 
Moreover, on average annually, over 85% of the market leaders were technology leaders.  
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due to missing values in the measurements of any of the variables, resulting in 1,952 
observations for the sample. 
In the next section, for Hypothesis 1, I specify the variables, conditional logistic model 
and results. I then specify the variables, survival analysis model, and results for Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3. 
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4.0  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 
Hypothesis 1 states that leading firms’ knowledge disclosure of core technologies is positively 
associated with the likelihood of laggards’ technology imitation rather than substitution. 
4.1 VARIABLES 
4.1.1 Dependent Variable: Laggards’ Imitation 
Laggards’ imitation (imitation) is a binary variable coded “1” if a laggard imitated the leading 
firm and “0” if it substituted the leading firm. As aforementioned, it is assumed that the 
conceptualization and operationalization of imitation and substitution are two ends of a 
continuum. Thus, a next-generation product that is introduced to a market by a laggard is either 
imitation or substitution, not both. Following studies that have used the HDD industry 
(Christensen & Bower, 1996; Ren, 2008), I looked at two core components of the hard disk drive 
(head and disk) and defined imitation if the laggards have used the same technology of the 
leading firms in each of the components. This history of the HDD industry shows that there were 
architectural changes in heads and disks between generations (such as the change in architecture 
when “Winchester Drives” were introduced), which represents a substitution in technology. The 
categorization of imitation and substitution was based on Jaffe’s (1989) measurement of 
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technological proximity, which is based on the “angular separation of the vectors.” I use this by 
measuring the technology overlap of the components in the products that firms introduce in a 
particular market segment. Let 𝑓ik be the fraction of firm i’s products that incorporates 
technology k. Then the vector 𝑓i = (𝑓i1 . . . 𝑓iK) locates the firm in a K-dimensional technology 
space. Technologically related firms are “close” to each other in this space, which is a proxy for 
imitation or substitution. The level of closeness between two firms i and j is calculated as:  
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The numerator will be large when most of i’s and j’s products incorporate the same 
technologies. The denominator normalizes the measure to be one if i and j are identical. Lij will 
be zero for pairs of firms with no overlap in the technologies, and unity for firms whose 
distributions are identical; it is conceptually similar to a correlation coefficient. I then 
categorized imitation as observations with one standard deviation above the mean of the 
closeness level, and substitution as those with one standard deviation below the mean in terms of 
closeness. 
4.1.2 Independent Variable:  Knowledge Disclosure by the Leading Firm 
Patent application is an important indicator of knowledge disclosure in that by filling for patents, 
the innovation that is identified and codified by inventors becomes part of the public record, and 
to some extent, filing for a patent indicates a decision to forgo the strategic motivations of 
secrecy (Coff et al., 2008). Namely, patent applications have disclosure effects, and examination 
of patents is also useful to identify the level of information released (Lhuillery, 2006). Prior 
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studies have acknowledged that the usefulness of each patent may not be immediately obvious 
and information asymmetries may well exist between the inventor and others that scrutinize 
patents (Coff et al., 2008; Lhuillery, 2006). Nevertheless, studies have considered firms’ 
strategic motivations of knowledge disclosure through patent application. For example, in the 
context of patent races, Baker and Mezzetti (2005) use a game theoretic model to show that firms 
defend themselves from rivals in the innovation competition. By disclosing through patents, 
leading firms may make it more difficult for rivals to patent inventions related to the disclosed 
information since “the invention must be that much better before it will represent a sufficient 
advance over the now-expanded prior art. (p. 6)” Namely, knowledge disclosure may thwart 
subsequent innovations to displace the rivals out of the race, or at least extend the race. Thus, the 
knowledge disclosing firms have a rational and strategic motivation. Lichtman et al. (2000) also 
shows that leading firms engage in knowledge disclosure through patents to reduce their rival’s 
expected payoff, and to promote favorable licensing agreements. Other studies have considered 
patent application as strategic knowledge disclosure activities, such as De Fraja (1993), Jansen 
and Wzb (1996), Anton and Yao (2003), Bar (2006), Baker & Mezzetti (2005) and Lichtman et 
al. (2000).  
I used the annual count of hard disk drive-related patents that were granted by the leading 
firms to measure knowledge disclosure by the leading firm (knowledge disclosure). This measure 
was weighted by the number of citations that a patent receives after it was granted. Studies of 
patenting suggested that ‘citations received’ is a commonly used indicator of its importance and 
value (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Coff et al., 2008; Fleming, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; 
Sorensen & Stuart, 2000), and thus has a tendency to gain more attention since patents with high 
citation rates represent “platforms for further innovations and may thus be associated with 
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knowledge-based competitive advantages.” (Coff et al., 2008: 17)  The USPTO website offers a 
patent search engine by criteria such as assignee name, title, abstract, and 
description/specification. These criteria were used to search for patents that were related to hard 
disk drive component technology. I also confirmed whether each patent was under the 
appropriate patent class according to the USPTO patent class system. Criteria for the patent 
classes were Dynamic Magnetic Information Storage or Retrieval (360), Electrical Systems and 
Devices (361), Data Processing (700 to 707), and Electrical Computers and Digital Processing 
Systems (708 to 714). 
4.1.3 Control Variables 
Prior research suggests that firms of different size engage in different types of innovation 
(Klepper & Simons, 1997). I measure firm size (size) for leading firms and laggards by total 
assets. Large firms may make greater disclosures to signal their competitive positions to the 
market since they have historically achieved higher profitability and have larger patent stocks 
than small firms (Lev & Penman, 1990). Compared to small firms, large firms may also face less 
imitation risk, may achieve lower marginal benefits from increasing the level of disclosure, and 
may experience weaker signaling effects of disclosure (James & Shaver, 2008). Also, prior 
research suggests that firm age (age) affects the rate at which firms innovate (Sorensen & Stuart, 
2000). Another control variable is R&D expense (R&D expense), measured by annual R&D 
expense in millions of dollars from the Compstat files. R&D expense indicates the extent to 
which firms have different levels of innovation that might influence the level of knowledge 
disclosure (James & Shaver, 2008). I control for self citations of patents (self citation) for each 
leading firm – the more other firms cite the technology, the more likely it is to become disclosed 
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since the innovation will have been disseminated more widely (Coff et al., 2008). Self-citation 
has been used as measurements for internal knowledge transfer and represents the extent to 
which the value of R&D is retained with the firm, expected to have an effect on knowledge 
disclosure (James & Shaver, 2008). The average backward citation (backward citation) level of 
the laggard, also known as ‘prior art,’ represents their knowledge stocks that has been utilized in 
their innovation efforts, that might affect the laggard’s propensity to imitate the leading firm. 
Meanwhile, firms engage in the local search of innovation by monitoring similar technological 
domains, and it is the absorptive capacity of the rivals that make it easier to understand and 
assimilate the knowledge disclosed by the leading firms (Coff et al., 2008). Cohen & Levinthal 
(1989, 1990) argued that absorptive capacity, namely, the ability of a firm to absorb 
technological capabilities or knowledge outside its boundaries, is more valuable when spillovers 
are present. Several studies have tested the influence of absorptive capacity regarding knowledge 
disclosure in technology (Agmon & von Glinow, 1991; Gambardella, 1992; Rosenberg & 
Frischtak, 1991). They broadly support the argument that higher levels of absorptive capacity 
improve a firm’s ability to exploit technical knowledge transferred from outside the firm 
(Mowery et al., 1996). A key assumption underlying Cohen & Levinthal’s (1989, 1990) 
argument is that “exploitation of competitors’ research findings is realized through the 
interaction of the firm’s absorptive capacity with competitors’ spillovers.” I adopt the same 
assumption for the model introduced in my dissertation. While knowledge flows from the 
leading firms, it is the rivals’ absorptive capacity that conditions the amount or quality of 
knowledge that they can recognize, assimilate, and apply to its strategic ends. Namely, if the 
rivals gain access to the leading firm’s innovative knowledge and understands to an adequate 
extent the underlying processes that produced the innovative knowledge, they may imitate the 
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leading firm to leverage its development costs. However, high levels of absorptive capacity may 
allow laggards to realize their innovation efforts and thus render them the ability to substitute the 
leading firms. Further, firms with low levels of absorptive capacity may introduce inferior but 
substitute products. Thus, the influence of laggards’ absorptive capacity may be positive or 
negative. Absorptive capacity (absorptive capacity) is measured by the annual R&D intensity of 
each firm in my sample, namely R&D expenditures over total assets. Previous studies have 
commonly used R&D intensity as a proxy for absorptive capacity (Arora & Ghoshal, 1994; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). To control for unintentional 
imitation and substitution by laggards, I included the number of manufacturing and supplier 
alliances a leading firm has entered (alliances) as an indicator for a leading firm working to bring 
a technology to market (Coff et al., 2008). Lastly, year dummies were included to control for 
dominant designs in certain years and industry-wide shocks that could have an influence on 
firms’ innovation activities. 
4.2 MODEL: CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS LOGIT 
For Hypothesis 1, I estimated the probability of a laggard imitating11
 
 the knowledge disclosing 
leader using logit models with maximum likelihood techniques. The general likelihood function 
for logit is: 
 
                                                 
11 As explained in the variables section, a laggard’s imitation means that it imitated rather than substituted.  
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where xj represents all independent variables and S is the set of all observations j such that Yj ≠ 0, 
F(z) = ez/(1 ez). Since my data contain firms that are observed multiple times annually due to the 
dyadic nature of the data structure (firms disclose their knowledge to multiple competitors), the 
observations for each firm dyad are not independent of each other. In such cases, a common and 
recognized option is to estimate fixed-effects models to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
namely, time-invariant factors associated with grouped observations (Lounsbury, 2007; 
Yamaguchi, 1996). I used the ‘xtlogit’ command in Stata 11.0 to estimate the conditional fixed-
effects logit models, which have been commonly used for dyadic panel data in management 
research (e.g. Karim & Williams, 2010; Marquis, 2006; Marquis & Huang, 2009; Rao et al., 
2001; Trinh & Mitchell, 2009; Yang et al., 2010). The model is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡∗ > 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
where xit-1 are lagged values of the independent and control variables and the random effects ui 
are realizations of independent draws from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard 
error σu. Specifying leader-laggard dyad effects should mitigate the possibility that the results are 
influenced by autocorrelation of errors within the dyads (Rao et al., 2001). 
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4.3 MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
I interpreted the regression coefficients using the method recommended by Tuma and Hannan 
(1984) and Long and Freese (2006). Unlike ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, logistic 
regression does not require normally distributed or homoscedastic independent variables 
(Safizadeh et al., 2008). For logistic regression diagnostics, I followed the UCLA Academic 
Technology Services on logistic regression diagnostics with STATA (Berry & Feldman, 1985; 
Long & Freese, 2006). To test multicollinearity, I used the ‘collin’ command in STATA 11.0 and 
obtained the variance inflation factor (VIF), an indicator of how much of the inflation of the 
standard error could be caused by collinearity. As a rule of thumb, a VIF of 10 or greater is a 
cause for concern. The average VIF for the variables in my model is 1.26, and the condition 
index, a measure of the overall covariation among variables in the model, is 2.15, below the 
suggested cut-off of 30 (Greene, 1993).  
To check the linear relation between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, I used a Box-Tidwell model (Box & Tidwell, 1962), which transforms a predictor using 
power transformations and finds the best power for model fit based on maximal likelihood 
estimate. All of the independent variables and the control variables showed p-values above 0.05, 
indicating that there is no need for further transformation of the independent variables for the 
model used in the analysis.  
To test for the “goodness-of-fit,” I used the Hosmer and Lemeshow's goodness-of-fit test. 
The main idea behind the test is “the predicted frequency and observed frequency should match 
closely, and that the more closely they match, the better the fit.” The Hosmer-Lemeshow chi-
squared of my model was 13.24 with a “probability > chi” of 0.10, indicating that the model fits 
the data well. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that leading firms’ knowledge disclosure of core technologies is 
positively associated with the likelihood of laggards’ technology imitation rather than 
substitution. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the main 
variables of interest. Based on the correlations, none of the correlations among the independent 
and control variables are sufficiently high to warrant concerns about multicollinearity. The 
highest correlation, firm age and firm size is 0.49 (p < 0.01) and understandable given the 
characteristics of the hard disk drive industry, since firms that have a long history tend to have 
grown throughout the years. For example, the oldest leading firms are those that are large in size, 
such as Fujitsu and Toshiba. Interestingly, the number of manufacturing alliances and supplier 
alliances (alliances), an indicator for a leading firm working to bring a technology to market, has 
a statistically significant correlation of 0.29 (p < 0.001). Thus, a leading firm’s alliances may be 
viewed as an additional channel of knowledge disclosure that affects the competitive actions of 
laggards.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
As shown in Table 2, the logistic regression is statistically significant, as evidenced by 
Log Likelihoods and Wald χ2 tests. As can be seen in Model 2 in Table 5, the level of knowledge 
disclosure by the leading firm has a statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of 
imitation of the laggard (β = 0.38, p < 0.01, SE = 0.02), supporting Hypothesis 1.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 57 
5.0  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR HYPOTHESIS 2 AND HYPOTHESIS 3 
Hypothesis 2 states that leading firms’ introduction of products with next-generation 
technologies occurs earlier as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase, and 
Hypothesis 3 states that laggards’ introduction of products with next-generation technologies 
occurs later as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase. 
5.1 VARIABLES 
5.1.1 Dependent Variable: Introduction of Next-Generation Product 
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is whether a leading firm introduced a next-generation 
product in a given month in the following year of its knowledge disclosure. The dependent 
variable for Hypothesis 3 is whether a laggard introduced a next-generation product in a given 
month in the following year of knowledge disclosure by a leading firm. The Disk/Trend database 
reports the shipping month and year of all hard disk drive products that had been introduced in 
the market during period of my sample, which is 1980 to 1999. A next generation product 
includes those that have incorporated technologies such as ‘thin-film’ heads and/or ‘thin-film’ 
coating of the disks, which are considered the core technologies in recording. 
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5.1.2 Independent Variable:  Knowledge Disclosure by The Leading Firm 
For Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, I used the annual count of hard disk drive-related patents 
that were granted by the leading firms at t-1 to measure knowledge disclosure by the leading 
firms. This measure was weighted by the number of citations that a patent receives after it is 
granted. 
5.1.3 Control Variables 
I included controls to ensure that my findings are robust. For the same reasons in Hypothesis 1, I 
included the firm size (size) leading firms and laggards, leading firms’ age (age), and self-
citations of leading firms and the laggards (self-citations), leading firms’ R&D expense (R&D 
expense), absorptive capacity of the laggards (absorptive capacity), and the number of 
manufacturing and supplier alliances a leading firm entered (alliances). Note that for Hypothesis 
2, only the controls for leading firms were included since the dependent variable is the 
introduction of next-generation products of the leader, and the independent variable is 
knowledge disclosure by the leader. 
5.2 MODEL: SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
I test Hypothesis 2 and Hypotheses 3 with survival analyses, of which the hazard rate is a central 
concept. Following Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), the hazard rate is defined as the probability 
that a firm exits the market in a moment t given that it has survived until this period and 
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conditional on a vector of xit, which may both include both time-varying and time-constant 
variables,  
𝜆(𝑡; 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚
𝑑𝑡→0
Pr (𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡\𝑇 ≥ 𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 
 
where T is a non-negative random variable (duration), which I assume continuous, so that λ(t) is 
an instantaneous rate of introducing a product with next-generation technology.  
I used a Cox proportional hazards model to predict the hazard of introducing a product 
with next-generation technology incorporated in it in a given month, annually. The estimation is 
performed using the semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards model (Cox, 1972): 
ℎ(𝑡; 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡) ∗ exp (𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽) 
where λ0(t) represents the baseline function obtained for values of covariates equal to 0 (xit = 0). 
In this specification, the effect of the independent variables is a parallel shift of the baseline 
function, which is estimated for all those firms that do not introduce products with next-
generation technologies up to a particular period. The baseline function is left unestimated and 
the model is estimated maximizing a partial likelihood function with respect to the vector of 
coefficients β without the need to estimate the baseline function (although it may be recovered 
non-parametrically). Since the baseline hazard function in the Cox Proportional Hazards model 
is left unestimated, the model addresses the potential problem of unobserved heterogeneity that 
may rise when the baseline function is not properly specified and when there are time-varying 
covariants in the model, which is the case of my study. 
However, a potential issue is that some cases multiple products are assigned to the same 
leading firm. Specifically, 1,725 products were newly introduced by 25 leading firms for an 
average of 69 products per firm. Since some of the observations are likely not to be independent, 
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we used the robust method of calculating standard errors and clustered the data by firm to relax 
the assumption of independence with respect to products introduced by the same leading firm 
(Coff et al., 2008). 
5.3 RESULTS 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that leading firms’ introduction of products with next-generation 
technologies occurs earlier as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase, and 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that leading firms’ introduction of products with next-generation 
technologies occurs later as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase. Table 
6 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the main variables of interest. 
Based on the correlations, leading firms seem to be more prone to introduce a product with next-
generation technologies when they disclose knowledge of technologies in the previous year. 
None of the correlations among the independent and control variables are sufficiently high to 
warrant concerns about multicollinearity. The highest correlation, firm age and firm size is 0.43 
(p < 0.01) and understandable given the characteristics of the hard disk drive industry, since 
firms that have a long history tend to have grown throughout the years. For example, the oldest 
leading firms are those that are large in size, such as Fujitsu and Toshiba. A leading firm’s size 
and the number of manufacturing and supplier alliances it entered also has a positive correlation 
of 0.29 (p < 0.05).  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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As shown in Table 7, the model is statistically significant, evidenced by the Wald Chi2 
test (χ2 = 12006.60, p < 0.001) and Log Likelihood (Log pseudo-likelihood = -31.94). The table 
includes odds ratios for each variable which indicate the extent to which changes in the variable 
increase (odds ratio >1) or decrease (odds ratio <1) the likelihood that the leader will introduce a 
next-generation product sooner. Model 1 shows only the control variables. Here, it is apparent 
that firms with heavily self-cited patents introduce next-generation products sooner. Specifically, 
a one unit increase in self citation in a patent of a leading firm increases the hazard of 
introducing a next-generation product sooner by 0.6 percent (odds ratio = 1.06). Firm size and 
R&D intensity raises the hazard rate of a leading firm to introduce a next-generation product 
sooner, while firm age reduces the hazard rate. Model 2, which is the full model, adds the 
independent variable associated with knowledge disclosure level of a leading firm. Here, 
knowledge disclosure by the leading firms clearly faced a higher hazard rate. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
is supported since higher levels of knowledge disclosure by leading firms increased the 
likelihood that it they will introduce next-generation products sooner than their rivals. Namely, 
by disclosing knowledge, leaders can promote imitation and delay substitution by laggards, 
resulting in a quicker finish to innovation. More specifically, a one unit increase in a patent 
disclosure weighted by its citations received increases the hazard of product introduction by 1 
percent (odds ratio = 1.01). Interestingly, the number of manufacturing alliances and supplier 
alliances a leading firm enters increases the hazard of introducing a next-generation product by 
2.9 percent (odds ratio = 1.029), presumably indicating that alliances are also an important 
channel of knowledge disclosure.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that laggards’ introduction of products with next-generation 
technologies occurs later as the level of the leading firms’ knowledge disclosure increase. Table 
8 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the main variables of interest. 
Based on the correlations, laggards seem to be late in introducing a product with next-generation 
technologies when leaders disclose knowledge of technologies in the previous year. None of the 
correlations among the independent and control variables are sufficiently high to warrant 
concerns about multicollinearity. Again, the highest correlation, leading firm’s age and leading 
firm’s size is 0.42 (p < 0.01) and understandable given the characteristics of the hard disk drive 
industry, since firms that have a long history tend to have grown throughout the years.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
As shown in Table 9, the model is statistically significant, evidenced by the Wald Chi2 
test (χ2 = 1450.48, p < 0.001) and Log Likelihood (Log pseudo-likelihood = -47.54). The table 
includes odds ratios for each variable which indicate the extent to which changes in the variable 
increase (odds ratio >1) or decrease (odds ratio <1) the likelihood that the breakthrough will be 
announced in the press. Model 1 shows only the control variables. The number of manufacturing 
alliances and supplier alliances a leading firm enters decreases the hazard of introducing a next-
generation product, specifically by 1.5 percent (odds ratio = 0.995), presumably indicating that 
alliances are also an important channel of knowledge disclosure. Model 2, which is the full 
model, adds the independent variable associated with knowledge disclosure level of a leading 
firm. Here, knowledge disclosure by the leading firms clearly decreases the hazard rate of 
laggards quickly introducing next-generation products. Specifically, a one unit increase in 
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knowledge disclosure through patents weighted by the citations received reduces the hazard by 
3.4 percent (odds ration = 0.966). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported since higher levels of 
knowledge disclosure by leading firms reduced the likelihood that laggards will introduce next-
generation products sooner than their rivals.  
   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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6.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study examined the effects of knowledge disclosure of leading firms on the competitive 
responses of competing laggards in the hard disk drive industry. It also examined how 
knowledge disclosure affects the competitiveness of a leading firm’s knowledge competencies. 
In fast-paced environments such as the hard disk drive industry, innovation is not an easy task, 
since firms have to deal with high levels of uncertainty from outside and within the firm. From 
the outside, firms are often faced with hyper-competition (D'Aveni, 1994), an environment of 
frequent competence-destroying turbulence. Firms are often under the pressure to change, to 
creatively destruct their own competencies (Schumpeter, 1942) and to move quickly to build new 
advantages and erode the advantages of their rivals (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; D'aveni & 
Thomas, 2004). From within, firms are making large investments to develop new technologies, 
and oftentimes managers are faced with the challenge to discern the appropriate technology 
tracks their firms should commit to and which ones they should avoid. In turn, they are 
confronted with the uncertainty of setting straightforward strategic goals to be successful in the 
competition. However, once firms decide on pursuing certain technology tracks, they need to 
build some elements of stability into their capabilities. Namely, to some degree, firms need to 
consistently improve on exploiting their established technologies, or competencies, in order to 
reap the return on investments they have made. Thus, here arises the task to manage the need to 
change frequently yet perform reliably within each technology track. My dissertation addressed 
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this issue of how does a leading firm sustain its knowledge-based advantage in a competitive 
landscape against threats of imitation and substitution?  
The findings of this study show how leading firms might strategically address the 
paradox of disclosure, namely, why firms would disclose knowledge and risk drawing attention 
of its rivals (Arrow, 1962; Coff et al., 2006; Coff et al., 2008; James & Shaver, 2008). Evidence 
from the empirical analyses indicates that knowledge disclosure by leading firms in the hard disk 
drive industry is an important factor that influences laggards’ competitive responses, namely, 
imitation and substitution. Also, leading firms that disclose knowledge of its current 
technological innovations have a higher probability of quickly introducing next-generation 
products. Further, knowledge disclosure of leading firms would delay substitute innovations of 
laggards, meaning that they might have turned the laggards’ scope of search away from 
substitution as a competitive response. Thus, leading firms may promote imitation by disclosing 
knowledge and delay substitution by prolonging the value of their technological capabilities. 
6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This study contributes to theories on competitive strategy (e.g. resource-based view, knowledge-
based view, and competitive dynamics) by exploring how firms might address threats of 
imitation and substitution. The literature on the resource-based view (RBV) has paid less 
attention on how to avoid substitution threats compared to imitation threats. Moreover, the RBV 
rarely explores how managers may actively play a role in managing the knowledge boundary of 
the firm, namely, appropriating or disclosing strategic knowledge about capabilities (Coff et al., 
2008). One of the basic assumptions of the RBV is that resources that have isolating mechanisms 
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such as causal ambiguity, firm specificity, or social complexity make it difficult for rivals to 
imitate (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). However, such resources are not entirely 
inimitable since rivals may develop their own substitutes (Adner & Zemsky, 2006; Coff et al., 
2008; Makadok, 2001).  
Meanwhile, firms that compete in environments that are characterized as high-velocity 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and hyper-competition (D'Aveni, 1994) are faced with high uncertainty and 
ambiguity in terms of technologies, pressured to make fast strategic decisions when searching for 
new innovations. In these situations it is vital how firms manage their knowledge-based 
competencies. Leading firms might affect laggards’ scope of search by disclosing knowledge, a 
mechanism of managing knowledge boundaries, to allow imitation to some extent and gear them 
away from potential innovations that may pose a substitutive threat. Thus, managing knowledge 
competencies in high-velocity environments could be considered as a dynamic capability, the 
firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address 
rapidly changing environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997), to prolong their 
established competitive advantages.  
I also contribute to the competitive dynamics literature. First, I build on the consideration 
within the literature that “the creative actions of leaders in pursuit of new opportunities elicit 
reactions from rivals in an attempt to destroy the advantages sought by the leaders.” (Smith et al., 
2001: 291) While it is important to examine the manner or process by which leaders and 
challengers act and react since it determines their performance and survival, my study attempts 
to “empirically identify strategic actions (knowledge disclosure) that will benefit from a delay in 
retaliation (delay in substitution), or making the moves as to maximize the delay.” (p. 318) 
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Second, the consideration of knowledge disclosure as a strategic action broadens the 
scope of types of competitive behavior. Prior studies in the competitive dynamics stream have 
considered examples of strategic actions such as product introduction  timing, advertisement 
polices, and market entry (Chen et al., 1992; Yu et al., 2009). However, there has not been much 
consideration on how firms make strategic actions and responses with their knowledge 
competencies. The results of my study indicate that knowledge-based strategic moves 
(knowledge disclosure) affect market-based strategic moves (product introduction). Also, Smith 
et al. (2001) emphasizes the context in which competitive actions and reactions take place and 
suggests that one of the uniqueness of competitive dynamics research has been the construction 
of samples of firms that are interacting with one another. Prior studies have examined samples 
from the airline industry (Smith et al., 1991), software producers (Young et al., 1996), and the 
stock market (Lee et al., 2000). My sample of the hard disk drive industry adds to this 
uniqueness in the sense that I have examined the vibrant context of strategic moves in terms of 
knowledge disclosure and product introduction in an industry where a high level of entry and 
exit has occurred. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study has several possible limitations. First, I focus on a single type of knowledge 
disclosure (patents). Considering an attention-based view of a firm, all patents might be equal in 
offering a sufficiently reliable signal to influence rivals to take competitive actions (Coff et al., 
2008). However, I weight the disclosure through patents by subsequent citations, which indicate 
the value of a patent and complementarily captures the meaningfulness of signals to rivals 
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(Harhoff et al., 1999; Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Trajtenberg, 1990). Nevertheless, my 
measurement of knowledge disclosure does not take into account the various and comprehensive 
effects of other knowledge disclosing channels, such as publications, announcements, research 
consortia, conferences, and alliances (Lhuillery, 2006). Scholars have argued that when firms 
build their knowledge base required to produce innovations, they do not solely rely on internal 
R&D investments but also turn to inter-organizational knowledge-diffusion networks (Almeida 
& Kogut, 1999; Jaffe et al., 1993; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Strategic alliances serve as channels 
of inter-organizational information flow, providing a means to gain and accumulate new 
knowledge for technological development and to open up opportunities of learning from partner 
firms (Inkpen, 2000; Kogut, 1988). Different profiles of alliance partners reflect different 
resources and capabilities such as reputation, quality, and research and development technologies 
(Gulati et al., 2009; Rothaermel, 2001; Stuart, 2000), from which a focal firm may benefit when 
searching for new knowledge. Considering that an alliance network serves as a locus of 
innovation by providing access to knowledge and resources, how firms will strategically disclose 
its innovative knowledge and the effects of disclosure on alliance partners offers merit for future 
research.  
Another limitation is that I consider only a one year lag as the period for competitive 
response (imitation and product introduction) to knowledge disclosure. Although I do not deviate 
far from the many studies in the competitive dynamics literature using one year as the ‘response 
window,’ my study does not capture long-term effects of competitive actions and reactions. 
Muller and Penin (2006) asserted that in the short run, disclosing knowledge is always profit 
decreasing for firms, but in the long run firms that have a high level of disclosure can be more 
profitable than firms with low level of disclosure, if they do not disclose too much knowledge.  
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Future studies may focus on the time dimension on competitive responses and how leader-
laggard relationships evolve over time.   
Lastly, my study does not focus on the various effects of knowledge disclosure on 
various players in the industry, including other leading rivals, suppliers, and other stakeholders. 
It may be interesting to examine, for example, whether the same type of knowledge disclosure 
has simultaneous but different effects among various strategic groups.  
Another interesting future direction would be the clarification of how the absorptive 
capacity of firms may affect the relationship between knowledge disclosure and competitive 
actions. In terms of competitor identification (Chen, 1996; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003), a positive 
moderating effect of absorptive capacity on the relationship between knowledge disclosure and 
the probability of imitation may imply that leading firms may take into consideration the 
different effects of a strategic move on its rivals. More specifically, depending on the level of its 
absorptive capacity, a following rival may become a direct competitor, an indirect competitor 
(substitute), or a potential competitor (Chen, 1996). Since laggards that possess high levels of 
absorptive capacity may show a higher propensity to imitate the knowledge-disclosing leader, 
the leader might consider them as direct competitors. Also, potential competitors might become 
direct competitors or indirect competitors, depending on the change of absorptive capacity levels. 
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Table 1. Sales of IBM Plug-Compatible Disk Drives, by Manufacturer, 1976-1987 
 
 
 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
 $ % $ % $ % $ % $ % $ % 
Ampex 5.0 2           
Calcomp 20.1 8           
Control Data 12.6 5 48.1 12 69.8 19 82.8 15 20.0 3   
ISS/Univac 88.2 35 61.8 15 33.3 9       
Memorex 103.1 41 95.4 24 108.4 29 121.8 22     
Storage Tech. 21.4 8 132.7 33 148.0 40 299.2 53 127.5 21 129.5 22 
Fujitsu       9.6 2 161.6 27 182.1 31 
Hitachi     1.1 0 18.0 3 231.2 39 283.6 48 
Nippon Peripherals   61.0 15   29.6 5 55.2 9   
Others 3.9 2   11.1 3       
Totals 254.3 100 399.0 100 371.7 100 561.0 100 595.5 100 595.2 100 
 Source: Christensen (1992) 
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Table 2. Top Ten Hard Disk Drive Firms by Market Share, 1987-1998 
 
 
Rank  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1 Firm 
$ Mil 
% 
IBM 
6,844.4 
41.2 
IBM 
8,973.9 
43.9 
IBM 
9,650.3 
42.5 
IBM 
11,979.1 
46.8 
IBM 
11,313.9 
45.9 
IBM 
9,373.7 
38.2 
2  Fujitsu 
1,482.7 
8.9 
Fujitsu 
1689.4 
8.3 
Seagate 
2,477.9 
10.9 
Seagate 
2,643.4 
10.3 
Seagate 
2,614.7 
10.6 
Seagate 
2,916.6 
11.9 
3  NEC 
1,271.8 
7.7 
Seagate 
1,346.6 
6.6 
Fujitsu 
1803.2 
8 
Fujitsu 
1,898.6 
7.4 
Fujitsu 
1,861.3 
7.6 
Conner 
2,234.2 
9.1 
4  Seagate 
1,065.7 
6.4 
NEC 
1235.6 
6 
NEC 
1,365.7 
6 
NEC 
1350 
5.3 
Conner 
1,567.6 
6.4 
Fujitsu 
1,588.7 
6.5 
5  Control Data 
848.7 
5.1 
Control Data 
1,108.8 
5.4 
Digital Equipment 
1,254.5 
5.5 
Conner 
1,337.3 
5.2 
NEC 
1,307.2 
5.3 
Quantum 
1,529.1 
6.2 
6  Digital Equipment 
724.9 
4.4 
Digital Equipment 
906.8 
4.4 
Hitachi 
1170 
5.2 
Digital Equipment 
1,195.5 
4.7 
Hitachi 
1,187.3 
4.8 
Maxtor 
1,299.9 
5.3 
7  Hitachi 
639.8 
3.9 
Hitachi 
884.8 
4.3 
Conner 
701.8 
3.1 
Hitachi 
1,179.6 
4.6 
Quantum 
1,072.4 
4.4 
Hitachi 
1,247.8 
5.1 
8  Miniscribe 
361.1 
2.2 
Miniscribe 
570.3 
2.8 
HP 
533.4 
2.4 
Maxtor 
779.5 
3 
Maxtor 
928.5 
3.8 
Western Digital 
941.3 
3.8 
9  HP 
328.1 
2 
HP 
402.6 
2.1 
Miniscribe 
469.1 
2.1 
Quantum 
710.1 
2.7 
Digital Equipment 
776.4 
3.2 
Digital Equipment 
886.9 
3.6 
10  Micropolis 
287.8 
1.7 
Micropolis 
349.3 
1.7 
Maxtor 
412.1 
1.8 
HP 
402.2 
1.6 
Western Digital 
540.1 
2.2 
NEC 
614.8 
2.5 
 
SUM 
 
13,855 
83.5 
 
17,468.1 
85.5 
 
19,838 
87.5 
 
23,475.3 
91.6 
 
23,169.4 
94.2 
 
22,633 
92.2 
Source: Christensen (2007) 
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Table 2. Top Ten Hard Disk Drive Firms by Market Share, 1987-1998 (Cont’d) 
 
 
Rank  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1 Firm 
$ Mil 
% 
IBM 
7,504.2 
34.5 
IBM 
6,332.3 
27.3 
IBM 
6,859.5 
25.8 
Seagate 
7,726.7 
26.8 
IBM 
7,591.5 
23.9 
IBM 
8,161.9 
27.1 
2  Seagate 
2,940.1 
13.5 
Seagate 
3,770.4 
16.2 
Seagate 
5,140.7 
19.3 
IBM 
7,024.8 
24.4 
Seagate 
7,284.9 
23.1 
Seagate 
5,942.9 
19.8 
3  Quantum 
2,001.1 
9.2 
Quantum 
2,900.6 
12.5 
Quantum 
3,845.4 
14.4 
Quantum 
4,372 
15.2 
Quantum 
4,921.1 
15.5 
Quantum 
3,717.2 
12.4 
4  Conner 
1800.7 
8.3 
Conner 
1,962.2 
8.4 
Western Digital 
2,291.1 
8.6 
Western Digital 
3,533 
12.3 
Western Digital 
4,236.3 
13.3 
Fujitsu 
3,021.9 
10.1 
5  Maxtor 
1,204.1 
5.5 
Western Digital 
1,717.9 
7.4 
Conner 
2,219.7 
8.3 
Fujitsu 
1,306.1 
4.5 
Fujitsu 
2,266.8 
7.1 
Western Digital 
2,871.9 
9.5 
6  Western Digital 
1,098.8 
5.1 
HP 
1,103.5 
4.8 
Fujitsu 
1,383.1 
5.2 
Maxtor 
1,072.2 
3.7 
Maxtor 
1,421.6 
4.5 
Maxtor 
2,408.2 
8 
7  Hitachi 
959.9 
4.4 
Fujitsu 
1038.7 
4.5 
Maxtor 
1,241.2 
4.7 
NEC 
706.9 
2.5 
Samsung 
731 
2.3 
Samsung 
1,077.8 
3.6 
8  HP 
943.8 
4.3 
Hitachi 
864 
3.7 
HP 
729.8 
2.7 
Hitachi 
409.1 
1.4 
Hitachi 
416.3 
1.3 
Hitachi 
629.4 
2.1 
9  Fujitsu 
886.9 
4.1 
Maxtor 
861.3 
3.7 
NEC 
596.8 
2.2 
Samsung 
320.2 
1.1 
NEC 
276.7 
0.9 
Iomega 
175.9 
0.6 
10  Digital Equipment 
601.3 
2.8 
Digital Equipment 
678 
2.9 
Hitachi 
515.7 
1.9 
Micropolis 
195.8 
0.7 
Iomega 
229.2 
0.7 
Syquest 
87.3 
0.3 
 
SUM 
 
19,940.9 
91.7 
 
21228.9 
91.4 
 
24823 
93.1 
 
26,666.8 
92.6 
 
29,375.4 
92.6 
 
2,8094.4 
93.5 
 Source: Christensen (2007) 
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Table 3. Number of Hard Disk Drive Firms Introducing Models Equipped with Thin-Film Heads, 1987-1999 
 
 
Year Number of HDD Firms Thin Film Heads 
1987 60 18 
1988 64 29 
1989 64 33 
1990 66 29 
1991 63 28 
1992 52 30 
1993 43 27 
1994 33 27 
1995 30 27 
1996 29 27 
1997 24 23 
1998 20 19 
1999 20 19 
Source: Disk/Trend Report 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables for Hypothesis 1 
 
 
  Mean SD Min Max Median 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. ImitationF  0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00       
2. Knowledge DisclosureL  4,698.45 9,247.01 0.00 54,187.80 722.00 0.21** 1.00      
3. SizeL 12,626.40 2,914.53 28.6 101,869.54 11,287.37 0.23** 0.22* 1.00     
4. SizeF 1,631.78 1,922.68 6.50 7,845.12 1,266.80 0.26* 0.26** 0.25* 1.00    
5. AgeL 10.37 10.51 1.00 42.00 7.32 0.11** 0.14* 0.49** 0.24*** 1.00   
6. R&D ExpenseL 1,213.01 1,160.51 5.12 5,132.14 56.47 0.35 0.34* 0.28* 0.19** 0.26*** 1.00  
7. Self CitationL 0.65 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.16** 0.23*** 0.04*** 0.18** 0.21* 0.15** 1.00 
8. Self CitationF 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.12* 0.08** 0.06** 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 
9. Backward CitationF 5.02 2.98 0.00 15.12 8.45 0.01*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.28 0.15*** 0.32*** 0.02** 
10. Absorptive CapacityF 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.15* -0.07* -0.11** 0.06* 0.03** 0.21*** 
11. AlliancesL 0.34 0.87 0.00 5.00 0.12 0.29*** 0.34 0.38* 0.13** 0.31*** 0.41*** 0.13* 
 
 
  8. 9. 10. 11. 
8. Self CitationF 1.00    
9. Backward CitationF 0.14*** 1.00   
10. Absorptive CapacityF -0.12 -0.08** 1.00  
11. AlliancesL 0.12*** 0.18** 0.04*** 1.00 
n = 746, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, L = Leader, F = Laggard 
75 
 
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for Laggard’s Imitation 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 Likelihood of Imitation by  
Laggards 
Model 1 
Control 
Variables 
 Model 2 
Full Model 
    Knowledge DisclosureL 
  
0.38** 
(0.02) 
    SizeL 0.14 
(0.04)  
0.35 
(0.03) 
    SizeF 0.23 
(0.16)  
0.43 
(0.08) 
    AgeL 2.73* 
(0.02)  
3.66*** 
(0.00) 
    R&D ExpenseL 
 
4.25 
(0.22)  
5.12 
(0.09) 
    Self CitationL 9.24 
(1.03)  
1.30 
(1.20) 
    Self CitationF -0.09 
(0.01)  
-0.12 
(0.02) 
    Backward CitationF -0.19 
(0.38)  
-0.17 
(0.39) 
    Absorptive CapacityF 0.98 
(0.38)  
0.63 
(0.89) 
    AlliancesF 1.33* 
(0.09)  
2.09* 
(0.00) 
    Observations 746  746 
Log Likelihood -88.39  -114.48 
Wald χ2 123.45***  210.94*** 
                                                                    * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, L = Leader, F = Laggard  
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables for Hypothesis 2, Survival Analysis 
 
 Mean SD Min Max Median 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7. 
1. Product IntroductionL  0.71 0.45           0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00             
2. Knowledge 
DisclosureL 
5,543.46 11,621.92           0.00 69,666.02 420.04 0.24 ** 1.00           
3. SizeL 17,057.02   24,478.01   55.99   102,714.80 5330.29 0.21 *** 0.25 ** 1.00         
4. AgeL 11.54   13.32           1.00 42.00 11.23 0.14 *** 0.22 *** 0.43 ** 1.00       
5. R&D ExpenseL 1,122.38   1,332.66   5.69 5,522.28 462.21 0.25 *** 0.10 ** 0.37 * 0.24 ** 1.00     
6. Self CitationL 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.07 0.05 * 0.25 ** 0.07 *** 0.10 *** 0.18 *** 1.00   
7. AlliancesL 0.44 0.96 0.00 5.00 0.00 0.28 *** 0.42  0.29 * 0.19 *** 0.26 ** 0.21 *** 1.00 
n = 1,725, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001, L = Leader, F = Laggard 
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Table 7. Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Next-Generation New Product Introduction, Hypothesis 2 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Product IntroductionL 
Model 1 
Control Variables 
Model 2 
Full Model 
Knowledge DisclosureL  1.010*** 
  (0.000) 
   
Firm SizeL 0.999 0.999 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Firm AgeL 1.008 1.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
   
R&D ExpenseL 1.001 1.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Self CitationL 1.060* 1.067* 
 (0.001) (0.021) 
   
AlliancesL 1.032** 1.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 1,725 1,725 
WaldChi2 637.00** 12,006.60*** 
Log Likelihood -32.18 -31.94 
     Standard errors in parentheses.  
Odds ratios are shown. Ratios greater than 1 indicate a heightened hazard 
associated with the variable (those less than 1 mark reduced hazards). 
       * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, L = Leader, F = Laggard 
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Variables for Hypothesis 3, Survival Analysis 
 
 Mean SD Min Max Median 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  
1. Product  IntroductionF  0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00            
2. Knowledge DisclosureL 4,957.32 9,923.00 0.00 57,275.25 410.83 -0.34 ** 1.00          
3. SizeL  16,866.00 4,214.42 55.99 10,2714.80 5,330.29 -0.25 *** 0.29 ** 1.00        
4. SizeF 1,613.03 2,074.34 11.04 8,530.64 558.44 0.28 *** 0.36 ** 0.29 *** 1.00      
5. AgeL 11.54   13.29           1 42 10.24 0.16 *** 0.24 ** 0.42 ** 0.25 ** 1.00    
6. R&D expenseL 1,113.17 1,325.91 5.69 5,522.26 462.21 0.29 * 0.33 * 0.27 *** 0.24 *** 0.23 ** 1.00  
7. Self CitationL 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.25 0.66 0.07 *** 0.26 ** 0.07 ** 0.13 ** 0.10 ** 0.19 *** 
8. Self CitationF 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.23 *** 0.13 ** 0.07 * 0.08 *** 0.04  0.06 *** 
9. Backward CitationF 5.92 3.03 0.00 13.00 5.01 0.16 *** 0.26 ** 0.20 *** 0.21 *** 0.12 ** 0.23 ** 
10. Absorptive CapacityF 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.06 -0.02  0.20 * -0.08 *** -0.06 * 0.05 * 0.07 ** 
11. AlliancesL 0.41 0.94 0.00 5.00 0.00 -0.36 *** 0.46  0.28 * 0.12 ** 0.22 ** 0.36 *** 
 
 
 8.  8.  9.  10.  11. 
7. Self CitationL 1.00  1.00       
8. Self CitationF 0.09 *** 1.00       
9. Backward CitationF 0.04 * 0.15 *** 1.00     
10. Absorptive CapacityF 0.29 *** -0.07 * -0.02  1.00   
11. AlliancesL 0.20 *** 0.10 *** 0.28 *** 0.05 * 1.00 
n = 1,952, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001, L = Leader, F = Laggard 
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Table 9. Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Next-Generation New Product Introduction, Hypothesis 3 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Product IntroductionF 
Model 1 
Control Variables 
Model 2 
Full Model 
 Knowledge DisclosureL  0.966*** 
  (0.000) 
   
 SizeL 1.000 0.999 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
 SizeF 0.983 1.014 
 (0.024) (0.001) 
   
 AgeL 0.986 1.056 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
 R&D ExpenseL 1.024 0.993 
 (0.031) (0.021) 
   
 Self CitationL 1.020 1.000** 
 (0.077) (0.189) 
   
 Self CitationF 1.012 0.809 
 (0.000) (0.084) 
   
 Backward CitationF 0.909 0.878 
 (0.080) (0.094) 
   
 Absorptive CapacityF 0.926 0.992 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
 AlliancesL 0.995* 0.987** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Observations 1,952 1,952 
WaldChi2 1,450.48*** 1,300.97*** 
Log Likelihood -47.54 -42.53 
     Standard errors in parentheses.  
Odds ratios are shown. Ratios greater than 1 indicate a heightened hazard associated with 
the variable (those less than 1 mark reduced hazards). 
       * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, L = Leader, F = Laggard 
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Figure 1. Areal Density by Form Factor, 1987-1999 
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Figure 2. Number of HDD Firms, Entries, and Exits, 1976 -1999 
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Figure 3. Major Components of the Hard Disk Drive 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hard_drive-en.svg 
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Figure 4. Substitution of Thin-Film Metal-Coated Disks for Particulate Oxide-Coated Disks 
Year 
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Figure 5. Substitution of Innovative Head Technology for Conventional Ferrite Head Technology 
Year 
# New Models with 
Thin Film Heads 
-------------------------- 
# New Models with 
Ferrite Heads 
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Ferrite & Metal-in-Gap Ferrite) 
2. Ratio of (TF & Metal-in-Gap 
Ferrite) to Conventional Ferrite 
Source: Christensen (1992) 
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